Cited by

Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 224-25 (1983) (holding unequal division of nearly thirty-year jointly-owned marital home unwarranted, and citing precedent concluding that “long-term” marriages exceeding twenty years — during which spouses worked and lived in jointly owned homes — supported equal division of those homes).

In Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225 (1983), we observed: “A marriage of only one or two years may be considered differently than a long-term marriage of ten, twenty, or thirty years.

While it may be proper, in some cases, to treat a short-term marriage differently from a long-term marriage, in other cases, it may not.

In a divorce proceeding, marital property is not to be divided by some mechanical formula but in a manner deemed “just” based upon the evidence presented and the equities of the case.

A marriage of only one or two years may be considered differently from a long-term marriage of ten, twenty or thirty years.

RSA 458:16-a, II; Rothbart, 141 N.H. at 76-77, 677 A.2d at 154 (court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, need not strictly apply common law formula to value pensions); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269 (1983) (“marital property is to be divided not by some magic formula,” but in a just manner) (decided under prior law).

In this case, the fact that the furnishings in the marital home were purchased with money the defendant earned primarily before the marriage did not exempt those furnishings from inclusion in the marital estate for equitable distribution.

Where the parties have invested money and effort for years in an asset like a family business or house, however, the result is different.

Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1983); Marsh v. Marsh, 123 N.H. 448, 462 A.2d 126 (1983).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 714-15, 497 A.2d 1187, 1189-90 (1985) (vested pension rights); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1983) (duration of marriage); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 123 N.H. 252, 255, 459 A.2d 282, 285 (1983) (tax consequences); Marsh v. Marsh, 123 N.H. 448, 450, 462 A.2d 126, 128 (1983) (age, health, stations, occupations, employ-ability of parties); Henderson v. Henderson, 121 N.H. 807, 810, 435 A.2

Hodgins, supra at 715, 497 A.2d at 1190 (vested pension rights); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 *525 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1983) (length of marriage); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 123 N.H. 252, 255, 459 A.2d 282, 285 (1983) (tax consequences); Marsh, supra at 450, 462 A.2d at 128 (contributions of the parties to the marriage).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 714, 497 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1985); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225-26, 459 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1983).

Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711, 715, 497 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1985); Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 270 (1983); see generally C. Douglas, 3 New Hampshire Practice, Family Law § 392.

A variety of circumstances may justify an unequal distribution; e.g., the fact that the marriage was of short duration, see Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1983); the association of a particular asset exclusively with one party since before the marriage, Grandmaison supra, or its recent acquisition through one party’s family relationship, Henderson v. Henderson, 121 N.H. 807, 810, 435 A.2d 133, 135 (1981); the parties’ relative abilities to

Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d 268, 269 (1983); Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979).

See, e.g., Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225-26, 459 A.2d 268, 270 (1983); Parker v. Parker, 122 N.H. 658, 662-63, 448 A.2d 414, 416 (1982); Ames v. Ames, 117 N.H. 554, 555, 374 A.2d 1181, 1181 (1977).

Henderson v. Henderson, 121 N.H. 807, 809, 435 A.2d 133, 135 (1981); see Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222, 225, 459 A.2d *361 268, 269 (1983).