Cited by

State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580 (1979) (stating that a warrantless entry may be sustained under the exigency exception if “the officers’ perception of the emergency was reasonably grounded in the facts known to them at the time” (emphasis added)); Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2017) (explaining that “bottom-line question” in

Whether a situation is sufficiently urgent to permit a warrantless search depends upon the totality of the circumstances, State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580 (1979), and is largely a question of fact for the trial court, whose determination we will not disturb unless it is clearly erroneous, State v. MacDonald, 129 N.H. 13, 21 (1986).

Whether a situation is sufficiently urgent to permit a warrantless search depends upon the totality of the circumstances, State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580 (1979), and is largely a question of fact for the trial court, which we will not disturb unless clearly erroneous, State v. MacDonald, 129 N.H. 13, 21 (1986).

The search of a home is subject to a particularly stringent warrant requirement because the occupant has a high expectation of privacy.

The search of a home is subject to a particularly stringent warrant requirement because the occupant has a high expectation of privacy.

The court, relying upon the “exigent circumstances exception” in State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573 (1979), denied the motion, finding that the officer’s entry onto the property was warranted because the situation was “sufficiently urgent and potentially dangerous that he had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand.” On appeal, the defendant argues that the totality of the circumstances did

In addition, the search of a home is subject to a particularly stringent warrant requirement because the occupant has a high expectation of privacy.

Part I, article 19 provides that “[e]very subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.” “A warrantless search is per se unreasonable and invalid unless it comes within one of a few recognized exceptions.” State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

We have previously recognized the reasonableness of limited intrusions for the protection of police officers and others, see State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 582, 409 A.2d 1134, 1140 (1979), cert.

The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search was constitutionally permissible.

State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. at 816, 486 A.2d at 301; State v. Kellenbeck, 124 N.H. at 764, 474 A.2d at 1391; State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580, 409 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1979), cert.

The State argues that an officer may enter where there is a “compelling need for immediate official action and a risk that the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant will present a substantial threat of imminent danger to life or public safety.” State v. Theodosopoulos, *667 119 N.H. 573, 580, 409 A.2d 1134, 1138-39 (1979), cert.

“A warrantless search is per se unreasonable and invalid, unless it comes within one of a few recognized exceptions.” State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

First, warrantless entries are “per se unreasonable” and illegal, unless the entry is made pursuant to one of a few recognized exceptions.

The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search was constitutionally permissible.

denied, 445 U.S. 967, reh’g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

See, e.g., State v. MacDonald, 129 N.H. 13, 20-21, 523 A.2d 35, 39-40 (1968); State v. Jones, 127 N.H. 515, 522, 503 A.2d 802, 807 (1985); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578-82, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137-40 (1979), cert.

“‘A warrantless search is per se unreasonable and invalid unless it comes within one of a few recognized exceptions.’” State v. MacDonald, 129 N.H. 13, 20, 523 A.2d 35, 39 (1986) (quoting State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

We have stated that the warrantless entry of a private dwelling must be supported by probable cause, State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137, cert.

The probable cause that is required for a warrantless search “is at least as great as that required to support a warrant.” State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

“A warrantless search is per se unreasonable and invalid, unless it comes within one of a few recognized exceptions.” State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); see N.H. Const, pt.

The burden is on the State to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a warrantless search was constitutionally permissible.

The State has the burden to demonstrate the legality of a seizure that is not authorized by warrant, State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), and the State and the defendant join issue on the applicability of the plain view doctrine to carry that burden.

See, e.g., Payton v. New York, supra at 576 (Federal Constitution prohibits warrantless arrest of suspect at his home, absent consent or exigent circumstances); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580, 409 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1979) (“The warrant requirement [under the Federal and State Constitu *817 tions] is particularly stringent for a search of a private dwelling, in which the occupant has a strong expectation of privacy and protection from government intrusion.”), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 983

rcement agent is confronted with an emergency which will permit the taking of a blood sample, without a search warrant, when he or she reasonably believes that “the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatenfs] ‘the destruction of evidence.’” Schmerber v. California, supra at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)); cf. State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580, 409 A.2d 1134, 1139 (1979) (under State constitutional law, whether the exigencie

We find that the search conducted by Gosselin at the Manchester Speed Shop was in substance a search brought about and orchestrated by the State police, but cast in the form of an administrative search conducted under the authority of RSA 262:11, in *689 order to enable the police to avoid the warrant requirements of our State Constitution.

denied, 445 U.S. 967 (1980) (same); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

Consequently, for the search to have been legal, it must have taken place pursuant to a warrant or one of the established *105 exceptions to the warrant requirement.

denied, 445 U.S. 967 (1980); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578, 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert.

State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 409 A.2d 1134 (1979), Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 437-38, 362 A.2d 194, 195 (1976).