Cited by

Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250-51 (2004), we have held that “where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct, an award of attorneys’ fees to his opponent is within the court’s power.” St.

Attorney’s fees have been awarded in this State based upon two separate theories: “bad faith litigation” as established in Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 690-91 (1977), and “substantial benefit” as articulated in Irwin Marine, Inc. v. Blizzard, Inc., 126 N.H. 271, 276 (1985).

“The purpose of the requirement is to test the claimant’s attachment to the job market, a determination which is made by reference to the facts and reasonable circumstances of each case.” St.

We infer that the trial court relied on the exception for parties who are “forced to litigate against an opponent whose position is patently unreasonable.” Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 502, 543 A.2d 1379, 1383 (1988); see also St.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); as “compensation for those who are forced to litigate in order to enjoy what a court has already decreed,” Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 502, 543 A.2d 1379, 1383 (1988); and “for those who are forced to litigate against an opponent whose position is patently unreasonable,” id.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977), and cases in which parties “are forced to litigate against an opponent whose position is patently unreasonable.” Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 502, 543 A.2d 1379, 1383 (1988).

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662, 377 *672 A.2d 620, 623 (1977), where a party’s conduct is “unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and.

Nonetheless, trial courts retain the discretion to award attorney’s fees where “litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct.” St.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); and as “compensation for those who are forced to litigate in order to enjoy what a court has already decreed” and for those who are “forced to litigate against an opponent whose position is patently unreasonable,” Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 502, 543 A.2d 1379, 1383 (1988).

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); as “compensation for those who are forced to litigate in order to enjoy what a court has already decreed,” Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 502, 543 A.2d 1379, 1383 (1988); see Indian Head National Bank v. Corey, supra at 86, 523 A.2d at 72; and “for those who are forced to litigate a

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 377 A.2d 620 (1977) do not require reversal of this case.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662-63, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977), that the award of attorney’s fees was within the court’s power and the discretion of the trial judge.

Germaine v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); Appeal of Longhi, 127 N.H. 570, 571, 503 A.2d 833, 834 (1986).

Harkeem v. Adams, supra at 688, 377 A.2d at 617; see also St.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 377 A.2d 620 (1977), establish the more comprehensive rule that “where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct, an award of attorneys’ fees to his opponent is within the court’s power.” *87 St.

Exceptions arise, however, “where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct.” St.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); Harkeem v. N.H. Dept. of Empl.

RSA 282-A:31, 1(c) (Supp. 1983); Philbrook v. Adams, 119 N.H. 298, 301, 401 A.2d 1070, 1072-73 (1979); St.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 662-63, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); therefore, on remand the court should consider the attorney’s fees issue in addition to the travel expenses already awarded.

See, e.g., Philbrook v. Adams, 119 N.H. 298, 401 A.2d 1070 (1979); St.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 377 A.2d 620 (1977); Griffin v. N.H. Dept. of Emp.

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 377 A.2d 620 (1977); Goings v. Riley, 98 N.H. 93, 95 A.2d 137 (1953).

Germain v. Adams, 117 N.H. 659, 377 A.2d 620, 623 (1977); see Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 377 A.2d 617 (1977); see Wilko v. Tap Realty, Inc. 117 N.H. 843, 379 A.2d 798 (1977).