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“[U]nder the established law of this State a trespass must be an intentional invasion of the property of another.” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 54 (1972).

Warranty actions differ from claims based on strict liability, and, in fact, “the multiple difficulties encountered in obtaining relief under [the Uniform Commercial Code’s] warranty provisions gave birth to the remedy of strict liability.”2 Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 54 (1972); see, e.g., Thibault, 118 N.H at 806 (explaining that before the adoption of strict liability, a consumer’s only recourse was an action “based either on the negligence of the manufacturer or, additionall

“[A] trespass [is] an intentional invasion of the property of another.” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 54 (1972).

In New Hampshire, strict liability is available only “where the Legislature has provided for it or [in] those situations where the common law of this state has imposed such liability and the Legislature has not seen fit to change it.” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 53 (1972) (ellipsis omitted).

at 559, 503 A.2d at 825; see Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 730, 475 A.2d 19, 25 (1984) (declining to extend a strict liability cause of action to purchasers of services); Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 53-54, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972) (rejecting tort standard of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity).

or [in] those situations where the common law of this state has imposed such liability and the Legislature has not seen fit to change it.” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 53, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972) (quotation omitted) (rejecting tort standard of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity); see also Johnston v. Lynch, 133 N.H. 79, 86, 574 A.2d 934, 938 (1990) (rejecting strict liability for collisions between motorists and children); 8 MCNAMARA, supra § 106, at 102.

We have also held, however, that “a causal violation of a statutory standard of conduct constitutes legal fault in the same manner as does the causal violation of a common-law standard of due care,” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972), and that “[t]he breach of a statutory duty results in liability.

The plaintiffs desire to characterize the count as alleging negligence because trespass is an intentional tort, Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 54, 289 A.2d 68, 72 (1972), and the State’s sovereign immunity has not been abrogated for the intentional torts of its employees and agents.

“[A] causal violation of a statutory standard of conduct constitutes legal fault in the same manner as does the causal violation of a common-law standard of due care....” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972); see also LaFavor v. Ford, 135 N.H. 311, 314, 604 A.2d 570, 572 (1992).

It is well established law in this State that a causal violation of a statutory standard of conduct constitutes legal fault in the same manner as does the causal violation of a common-law standard of due care____” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972).

“[A] causal violation of a statutory standard of conduct constitutes legal fault in the same manner as does the violation of a common law standard of due care....” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972).

In Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 289 A.2d 68 (1972), we held that the then-existing “Dam in Disrepair” statute did set out a standard of conduct which, if violated, could serve as a basis of recovery for property owners whose lands had been flooded.

Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 53-54, 289 A.2d 68, 71-72 (1972) (describing but rejecting tort standard of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity).

Bagley v. Controlled *470 Environment Corp., 127 N.H. 556, 558-59, 503 A.2d 823, 825 (1986); Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972).

lations was “negligence per se.” The plaintiffs thus seek a determination that an OSHA regulation has the force of statute for purposes of applying the rule that “[cjausal violation of a statute is a legal fault.” Frost v. Stevens, 88 N.H. 164, 167, 184 A. 869, 872 (1936); see Bagley v. Controlled Environment Corp., 127 N.H. 556, 561, 503 A.2d 823, 826-27 (1986); Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972).

Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972).

at 569, 374 A.2d at 1190; cf. Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 54, 289 A.2d 68, 72 (1972).

Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 70-71 (1972) (court decides as matter of law that injury was within risk of danger against which statute protected); 2 F. Harper & F. James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 17.6, at 1003 (1956).

Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52-53, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972); Hodgdon v. Gallagher, 114 N.H. 581, 325 A.2d 792 (1974).

Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52-53, 289 A.2d 68, *583 71 (1972); Frost v. Stevens, 88 N.H. 164, 167, 184 A. 869, 871 (1936).

He must go further and show that his injury was caused by his exposure to a hazard from which it was the purpose of the statute to protect him.” Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N.H. 198, 200, 165 A. 715, 716 (1933); Martin v. Kelley, 97 N.H. 466, 469, 92 A.2d 163, 166 (1952); see Moulton v. Groveton Papers, 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972); Vassillion v. Sullivan, 94 N.H. 97, 101, 47 A.2d 115, 118 (1946); Fontaine v. Charas, 87 N.H. 424, 426, 181 A. 417, 418 (1935).

This court in Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 289 A.2d 68 (1972), considered motions to dismiss certain grounds on which plaintiffs sought to recover their damages.

Moulton v. Groveton *189 Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 53, 289 A.2d 68, 72 (1972).