Attorney General v. Hood

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Rockingham
Case No. 2023-0663
Citation: Attorney General v. Hood, 2025 N.H. 3

ATTORNEY GENERAL

v.

CHRISTOPHER HOOD & a.

Argued: June 27, 2024
Opinion Issued: January 10, 2025

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor
general (Sean R. Locke, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and
orally), for the New Hampshire Attorney General.

Gens & Stanton, P.C., of Boston, Massachusetts (Bradford R. Stanton
and William E. Gens on the brief, and William E. Gens orally), for the
defendants.

American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire Foundation, of
Concord (Gilles R. Bissonnette and Henry R. Klementowicz on the brief), and
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, of New York, New York (Brian
Hauss, Tyler Takemoto, and Ben Wizner on the brief), as amici curiae.

PER CURIAM.

¶1 The New Hampshire Attorney General (the State) appeals a decision
of the Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) dismissing its complaints under New
Hampshire’s Civil Rights Act (the Act), RSA chapter 354-B (2022), against the
defendants, Christopher Hood, Leo Anthony Cullinan (now deceased), and
Nationalist Social Club-131 (NSC-131). The State argues that the trial court
erred in determining that, to avoid a construction of the Act that would be
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, the State must establish that the
defendants trespassed or conspired to trespass knowingly. We conclude that
the State’s construction of the Act is unconstitutional and that the trial court
properly limited its scope. We further conclude that the State failed to state a
claim under the Act and affirm the order granting the defendants’ motions to
dismiss without prejudice.

I. Facts

¶2 The following facts are derived from the State’s complaints and are
assumed to be true for the purposes of this appeal. See Barufaldi v. City of
Dover, 175 N.H. 424, 425 (2022). On July 30, 2022, a group of approximately
ten people associated with NSC-131, an unincorporated association that
describes itself, in part, as a “pro-white, street-oriented fraternity dedicated to
raising authentic resistance to the enemies of [its] people in the New England
area,” gathered on a highway overpass in Portsmouth. The group hung
banners, one of which read “KEEP NEW ENGLAND WHITE,” from the overpass.

¶3 Shortly thereafter, officers from the Portsmouth Police Department
responded to the scene and informed Hood, whom they identified as the
group’s leader, that the group was violating a Portsmouth municipal ordinance
that prohibited hanging banners from the overpass without a permit. Hood
then instructed his associates to remove the banners from the overpass,
although some individuals continued to display the banners by hand. The
officers interacted with the group on the overpass for approximately twenty to
twenty-five minutes before the group departed. NSC-131 subsequently took
credit for the episode on social media.

¶4 The State filed complaints against the defendants seeking civil
penalties and injunctive relief for their alleged violation of RSA 354-B:1. The
State alleged that Hood and Cullinan violated and/or conspired to violate the
Act when they led or aided a group of individuals to trespass upon the property
of the State of New Hampshire and the City of Portsmouth by hanging banners
reading “Keep New England White” from the overpass without a permit because
their conduct was “motivated by race and interfered with the lawful activities of

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others.” The State alleged that NSC-131 violated the Act when its members
developed and executed a plan to commit the aforementioned act. Hood and
Cullinan moved to dismiss the complaints against them. The State objected.

¶5 Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court consolidated the
three cases and subsequently issued an order dismissing the complaints
against all three defendants. In its order, the trial court agreed with the State
that, because the term “actual . . . trespass on property,” RSA 354-B:1, I, is not
defined in the Act, its definition must derive from the common law definition of
civil trespass. The trial court then determined that although the State had
sufficiently alleged that the defendants committed or conspired to commit an
“actual . . . trespass on property” under a theory of common law trespass, the
State’s construction of the Act would be unconstitutionally overbroad in
violation of the defendants’ right to freedom of speech.1 As a result, the court
concluded that the State had failed to sufficiently state a claim for relief under
the Act. The State moved for reconsideration, arguing in part that the trial
court had failed to consider in its definition of common law trespass that an
actor must enter upon the land of another without privilege or permission and
that such limiting language renders the application of trespass to the Act
constitutional and not overly broad.

¶6 In October 2023, following another hearing, the trial court denied
the State’s motion for reconsideration. However, the court agreed with the
State that, for a common law trespass to occur, entry onto the land must be
unprivileged. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the statute remained
unconstitutionally overbroad. The court explained that “the problem remains
that the State’s interpretation of the Civil Rights Act lacks limiting principles
necessary to prevent an impermissible chill on free speech.” It then reasoned
that “the text of the Civil Rights Act is . . . susceptible to a narrower
construction that an actor must ‘knowingly’ trespass or be aware that their
presence is not privileged to constitute a ‘trespass’ for purposes of” RSA 354-
B:1, I. The court concluded that “if a person only commits an actual trespass
for purposes of the Civil Rights Act where the person, knowing that they are
not licensed or privileged [to] do so, enters or remains in any place,” the court’s
concerns regarding any chill the statute would have on free speech would be
eliminated. Because it determined that the State failed to allege that the
defendants knew they were not licensed or privileged to enter and remain on
the overpass, the court concluded that the State had failed to state a claim for
relief under the Act.

¶7 In response, the State again moved for reconsideration, asserting
that the court “depart[ed] from its reasoning in its [order on the motion to

1 The court rejected the State’s arguments that the defendants’ conduct constitutes criminal

trespass, see RSA 635:2, I; a violation of the Portsmouth City Ordinances; or unauthorized posting
and advertising, see RSA 236:27.

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dismiss] and raise[d] new issues that were neither addressed nor discussed in
the pleading or at the August 9, 2023 hearing on the motion to reconsider.”
The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed within 30 days from the
clerk’s notice of decision on the State’s first motion for reconsideration.

II. Analysis

¶8 When reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, we assume
the truth of the facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s pleadings and construe all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Barufaldi, 175
N.H. at 427. The standard of review when considering a motion to dismiss is
whether the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction
that would permit recovery. Id. This threshold inquiry involves testing the
facts alleged in the pleadings against the applicable law. Id. We will uphold
the granting of the motion to dismiss if the facts pled do not constitute a basis
for legal relief. Id.

¶9 As an initial matter, the parties disagree over the proper definition
and scope of the term “trespass on property” as used in the Act. See RSA 354-
B:1, I. Resolving this dispute requires us to engage in statutory interpretation,
and we review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. See Hynes v.
N.H. Democratic Party, 175 N.H. 781, 787 (2023). We first look to the language
of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its
plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret the statute as written and will
not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the
legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute
together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust
result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but
rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id.

¶10 This is our first occasion to address the scope and framework of the
Act, which authorizes civil enforcement by the Attorney General, provides for
injunctive relief, see RSA 354-B:2, :3, and supplements existing criminal
statutes, see, e.g., RSA 631:4 (2016) (criminal threatening); RSA 635:2 (Supp.
2023) (criminal trespass); RSA 651:6, I(f) (Supp. 2023) (hate crimes sentencing
enhancement). RSA 354-B:1 provides:

I. All persons have the right to engage in lawful activities and to
exercise and enjoy the rights secured by the United States and New
Hampshire Constitutions and the laws of the United States and New
Hampshire without being subject to actual or threatened physical
force or violence against them or any other person or by actual or
threatened damage to or trespass on property when such actual or
threatened conduct is motivated by race, color, religion, national
origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity, or

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 disability. “Threatened physical force” and “threatened damage to
or trespass on property” is a communication, by physical conduct
or by declaration, of an intent to inflict harm on a person or a
person’s property by some unlawful act with a purpose to terrorize
or coerce.

II. It shall be unlawful for any person to interfere or attempt to
interfere with the rights secured by this chapter.

¶11 The defendants assert that the Act’s definition of “threatened
damage to or trespass on property” applies to actual trespass. In their view,
“trespass on property” for purposes of the Act is “a communication, by physical
conduct or by declaration, of an intent to inflict harm on a person or a person’s
property by some unlawful act with a purpose to terrorize or coerce.”
(Emphases omitted.) The State, on the other hand, maintains that although
the second sentence of RSA 354-B:1, I, defines “threatened physical force” and
“threatened damage to or trespass on property,” the Act does not define with
greater particularity the scope of the term actual “trespass on property.” We
agree with the State. By the Act’s plain language, the second sentence of RSA
354-B:1, I, pertains only to threatened physical force, threatened damage to
property, and threatened trespass on property. See RSA 354-B:1, I. It does
not apply to the actual variants of the conduct included within the Act’s scope.
See id.

¶12 Having concluded that the plain language of the Act does not define
trespass on property, we next turn to the proper definition of trespass as
contemplated by the Act. The State contends that “[f]or an actor to commit a
trespass, the actor, without permission, privilege, or authorization, must
intentionally enter onto the property of another.” We agree. “[U]nder the
established law of this State a trespass must be an intentional invasion of the
property of another.” Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 54 (1972).
“‘One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he
thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he
intentionally . . . enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing
or a third person to do so.’” Case v. St. Mary’s Bank, 164 N.H. 649, 658 (2013)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, at 277 (1965)).

¶13 Here, the State alleged that the defendants “trespassed upon the
property of the State of New Hampshire and the City of Portsmouth when [they
and other individuals] displayed banners reading ‘Keep New England White’
from the overpass without a permit.” In objecting to Hood’s motion to dismiss,
the State argued that “[t]he defendant displayed a banner upon the fencing—
causing a thing to enter upon land in possession of another, without any prior
authorization from city or state authorities.” Because the State alleged that the
defendants intentionally invaded the property of another, and because “[t]he

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State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,” Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976), we conclude that the State’s complaints
sufficiently alleged a civil trespass.

¶14 Nonetheless, we must next determine whether the State’s proposed
construction of the Act, applying the aforementioned definition of trespass,
violates the defendants’ constitutional rights to free speech. The defendants
maintain that the State’s construction of the Act “raises a host of constitutional
free speech issues.” The State disagrees and argues that the trial court erred
“when it found that the State’s interpretation and application of the Act was
overbroad, vague, and violated the defendants’ right to freedom of speech.”

¶15 We review questions of constitutional law de novo. State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 199 (2009). When reviewing a legislative act, we presume it to
be constitutional and will not declare it invalid except upon inescapable
grounds. Id. In other words, we will not rule that a statute is unconstitutional
unless a clear and substantial conflict exists between it and the constitution.
Id. at 200. We first address the defendants’ claims under the State
Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983).

¶16 Part I, Article 22 of our State Constitution provides: “Free speech
and liberty of the press are essential to the security of freedom in a state: They
ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 22.
Similarly, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the
passage of laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend I. It
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).

¶17 In the First Amendment context, courts are particularly concerned
about overbroad and vague laws that may have a chilling effect on speech.
Montenegro v. N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 N.H. 215, 220 (2014). Courts
are suspicious of broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression, and
therefore precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms. Id. Although not identical, vagueness
and overbreadth challenges in the First Amendment context are alternative and
often overlapping grounds for the same relief, namely invalidation of the
offending regulation. Id. at 221.

¶18 The vagueness doctrine, which applies when the statutory language
is unclear, is concerned with notice to the potential wrongdoer and prevention
of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Id.; see also State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006) (explaining that vagueness may invalidate a statute
for either of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary

6
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits;
or (2) it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement). The absence of clear standards guiding the discretion of the
public official vested with the authority to enforce the enactment invites abuse
by enabling the official to administer the policy on the basis of impermissible
factors. Montenegro, 166 N.H. at 222. Furthermore, where a vague statute
abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to
inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. Id. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked. Id.

¶19 The overbreadth doctrine protects those persons who, although
their speech or conduct is constitutionally protected, may well refrain from
exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of
application to protected expression. See Hynes, 159 N.H. at 202. In other
words, a statute is void for overbreadth if it attempts to control conduct by
means which invade areas of protected freedom. Id. “While the Constitution
gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the
First Amendment’s vast and privileged sphere, the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine to be employed only as a last resort.”
Id. (quotation omitted).

¶20 The defendants contend that the State’s interpretation of the Act is
overbroad and would have a chilling effect on freedom of speech. To prevail,
the defendants must establish: (1) that no set of circumstances exists under
which the State’s construction would be valid; or (2) that the State’s
construction of the Act is overbroad “in that ‘a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the [Act’s] plainly
legitimate sweep.’” Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Resources & Economic Dev.,
163 N.H. 215, 220-21 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
473 (2010)). To determine whether a substantial number of a statute’s
applications are unconstitutional, we must consider the applicable
constitutional standard. See id. at 221. As the United States Supreme Court
has explained, “the standards by which limitations on speech must be
evaluated differ depending on the character of the property.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988) (quotation omitted); see Doyle, 163 N.H. at 221.

¶21 Thus, we must analyze the character of the government property at
issue. Doyle, 163 N.H. at 221. Government property generally falls into three
categories — traditional public forums, designated public forums, and limited
public forums. Id. Here, the trial court correctly reasoned that because
“application of the Civil Rights Act requires no consideration of the relevant
forum or the nature of the underlying regulations as to that forum,” it applies
“with equal force in traditional public fora as it does in limited or nonpublic

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fora.” We agree with the trial court’s assessment and proceed to the regulation
at issue.

¶22 Government regulation of speech is content-based if a law applies
to a particular type of speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed. See State v. Lilley, 171 N.H. 766, 781 (2019). The State
argues that the Act “does not become a content or viewpoint-based action
because the State relies upon a defendant’s speech.” Rather, it maintains that
“[c]onsidering an actor’s motivation to assess whether that remedy may be
warranted has no impact on the person’s right to freedom of speech, even when
proof of motivation relies upon evidence of the person’s speech, because a
person’s motivation has always been a proper consideration.” We disagree.
The Act prohibits threatened and actual conduct only when “motivated by race,
color, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity, or
disability.” RSA 354-B:1, I. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s assessment
that “[b]ecause the Civil Rights Act’s additional sanctions apply only where a
speaker is ‘motivated by race’ or another protected characteristic, it is ‘content-
based’ in that it ‘applies to . . . particular speech because of the topic discussed
or the idea or message expressed.’” (Quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576
U.S. 155, 163 (2015).)

¶23 Content-based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. Doyle, 163 N.H. at 221; Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). The State asserts that the requirement
that a trespass be unprivileged or otherwise unlawful functions as a limitation
sufficient to prevent its construction of the Act from being unconstitutionally
overbroad. We are not persuaded. The trial court determined, and we agree,
that although “prohibiting or discouraging interference with the lawful rights of
others by way of bias-motivated conduct (including actual trespass) is a
compelling government interest,” the State’s construction of the Act “is overly
broad and not narrowly tailored to that end because, so construed, the Civil
Rights Act applies in numerous circumstances which have no relation to this
interest.”

¶24 The following example used by the trial court illustrates this point.

For example, a person’s disability rights protest at Veteran’s Park in
Manchester continuing after 11 p.m. may violate the [ordinance
imposing a curfew] at issue in [State v. Bailey, 166 N.H. 537 (2014)],
even if the protestor held a good faith belief that the regulation began
at midnight or that there was no such curfew. See 166 N.H. at 542.
Under the broader construction of the Civil Rights Act, the protestor
will have violated [the Act] through their unprivileged presence on
public property motivated by ‘disability,’ provided the protestor
sufficiently ‘interferes’ with the lawful rights of others in doing so.

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 Likewise, if the person were ‘motivated by . . . sex’ to be in Veteran’s
Park after 11 p.m. for reasons unrelated to any political protest, the
person similarly will have violated the Civil Rights Act even if they
were unaware of the curfew, provided there is a sufficient showing
of ‘interference.’ See id.

Although regulation of the defendants’ banners may serve the compelling
government interests of preventing interference or attempted interference with
the rights secured by the Act, this example demonstrates that it is not narrowly
tailored to do so. See State v. Bailey, 166 N.H. 537, 545 (2014) (“[T]he validity
of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the
government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the
government’s interests in an individual case.” (quotation omitted)).

¶25 The overbreadth of the State’s construction of the Act creates an
unacceptable risk of a chill on speech protected by Part I, Article 22 of our
State Constitution. Cf. Doyle, 163 N.H. at 228 (concluding regulation that was
“unconstitutional in a substantial number of its applications” was overbroad).
As the trial court noted, “[t]he right to free speech forbids this result.” See N.H.
CONST. pt. I, art. 22. Specifically, the State’s construction of the Act would
impose government sanctions on those who unintentionally trespass on public
property and whose presence is “motivated by” one of the characteristics
enumerated in RSA 354-B:1, I. Such a broad sweep discourages the
expression of certain messages for fear of government sanctions under the Act
based on the content of the messages expressed. See Hynes, 159 N.H. at 202.
Because the State’s construction of the Act “attempts to control conduct by
means which invade areas of protected freedom,” we conclude that it is void for
overbreadth. See id. (quotation omitted).

¶26 Our conclusion is supported by considering the vagueness
concerns raised by the trial court. As the trial court explained, “reading the
trespass provision to include good faith, negligent trespass would fail to provide
people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what
conduct the Civil Rights Act prohibits.” Furthermore, “[t]he absence of a
‘knowing’ mental state would charge the public with maintaining an actual,
encyclopedic knowledge of a potentially limitless number of existing and future
regulations governing all types of public fora on all government property before
engaging in otherwise protected speech.” We agree that such an expectation of
citizens who enter public property is not reasonable.

¶27 Given this conclusion, we must next determine whether the trial
court’s limiting construction sufficiently narrowed the Act’s scope. See State v.
Gubitosi, 157 N.H. 720, 727 (2008) (“If a statute is found to be substantially
overbroad, the statute must be invalidated unless the court can supply a
limiting construction or partial invalidation that narrows the scope of the

9
statute to constitutionally acceptable applications.” (quotation omitted)). When
narrowing a statute, “we try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is
necessary, for we know that a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent
of the elected representatives of the people.” Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New Engl., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quotation and brackets
omitted). The “touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent,
for a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the
legislature.” Id. at 330 (quotation omitted).

¶28 The trial court imposed a mens rea requirement for trespass,
explaining that “if a person only commits an actual trespass for purposes of the
Civil Rights Act where the person, knowing that they are not licensed or
privileged [to] do so, enters or remains in any place, this eliminates many of the
concerns outlined above.” The court explained that this narrower construction:
(1) “eliminat[es] the vagueness concern as to the public’s awareness of what
conduct is prohibited”; (2) “limits the concern for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement because it excludes” those “who have a good faith belief that they
are engaging in lawful, protected speech but accidentally run afoul of a
regulation of government property”; and (3) “confine[s] the government’s
regulation of speech under the Civil Rights Act to the permissible ‘evidentiary
use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.’”
(Quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).)

¶29 The State argues that the trial court’s adoption of a “knowing”
mental state “failed to follow the rule that its limiting construction nullify no
more of the legislature’s work than necessary” and that a “knowing mental
state was unnecessary to protect the defendants’ constitutional rights.” As
support for its argument, the State points to the United States Supreme
Court’s holding that the First Amendment requires proof that a defendant
acted recklessly in true threat cases and that such a requirement “offers
enough breathing space for protected speech, without sacrificing too many of
the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats.” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 78-82 (2023) (quotations omitted).

¶30 We disagree that the trial court’s construction nullifies the
legislature’s work or sacrifices the benefits of enforcing laws against true
threats. Instead, we concur with the trial court’s reasoning and accept its
narrowing language. The “knowing” mens rea requirement narrows the scope
of the Act to exclude negligent trespass without unduly restricting the Attorney
General from enforcing the Act against those who interfere or attempt to
interfere with the rights protected by RSA chapter 354-B. See RSA 354-B:1, II;
RSA 354-B:2, I. We hold that, to state a claim for a violation of the Act
predicated upon actual trespass on property, the State must establish that the
actor, with knowledge that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so,
enters land in the possession of another or causes a thing or a third person to

10
do so, see Case, 164 N.H. at 658, and that the trespass was “motivated by race,
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, sex, gender
identity, or disability.” See RSA 354-B:1, I.

¶31 This holding is narrow and applies only to violations of the Act
based upon actual trespass on property. We have no occasion to opine as to
the other variants of threatened or actual conduct within the Act’s scope. See
id. If the legislature disagrees with our interpretation, it is free to amend the
statute as it sees fit within constitutional bounds. See Doe v. Comm’r, N.H.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 174 N.H. 239, 261 (2021).

¶32 Finally, having concluded that the trial court properly supplied a
limiting construction, we consider whether the State’s allegations are
nonetheless “reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit
recovery.” Barufaldi, 175 N.H. at 427. The State asserts that “even when read
in conjunction with the . . . knowledge requirement,” its complaints state “a
viable claim against the defendants for a violation of the Act.” Specifically, the
State maintains that the complaints “alleged that the defendants took steps to
conceal their identities, refused to identify themselves for police, attempted to
conceal where they had parked, and other factual claims that would support
the inference that the defendants knew their conduct was unlawful.” Although
on a motion to dismiss we construe all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, see id., we are not persuaded.

¶33 The facts pled do not constitute a basis for legal relief under the
narrower construction of the Act. See id. The complaint against Hood alleged
that he was not wearing a mask, “stepped forward and spoke with the officers,”
and identified himself as the group’s leader. NSC-131 allegedly “took credit for
the display of the banners” on its social media profiles. Furthermore, the
group removed the banners from the overpass fence when they were apprised
that they were trespassing on public property, and “[s]ome of [NSC-131’s]
members stood on the overpass and continued to display the banners by
hand.” Even when construing all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the State, we are not persuaded that the complaints sufficiently
allege that the defendants knowingly trespassed. See id.; RSA 354-B:1, I.

¶34 In summary, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled that
the State’s complaints fail to state a claim against the defendants. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s ruling without prejudice. See ERG, Inc. v. Barnes, 137 N.H. 186, 189-92 (1993).

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ.,
concurred.

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