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A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of both the state and federal constitutions; its scope must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.

to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.’” State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 22 (2004) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).

“whether: (1) the question is reasonably related to the initial justification for the stop; (2) the law enforcement officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that would justify the question; and (3) in light of all the circumstances, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed its fundamental nature.” 2 State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 25 (2004).

State v. Dalton, 165 N.H. 263, 265 (2013); see State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 22-23 (2004).

In State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19 (2004), we adopted a three- part test for determining whether questioning during a traffic stop is permissible.

A traffic stop is a “seizure,” even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.

even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 22 (2004) (quotation omitted).

Because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances, see State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 27 (2004), we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.

at 265; see State v. McKinnon- Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 22-23 (2004).

In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.

A traffic stop is a “seizure.” State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 22 (2004).

Because the officer could not determine whether the transparent sticker was a valid inspection sticker, he was permitted to “engag[e] in facially innocuous dialog which a detained motorist would not reasonably perceive as altering the fundamental nature of the stop.” State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 25 (2004) (quotation omitted).

State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 25 (2004) (adopting three-part test to determine when a police officer’s questions exceed the scope of an initially valid investigatory stop).

In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or.are clearly erroneous.

269, 271 (9th Cir. 1970) (while the police should be given “reasonable latitude” to determine when a warrant is to be executed, “it is also necessary that search warrants be executed with some promptness in order to lessen the possibility that the facts upon which probable cause was initially based do not become dissipated”); and (3) conducting traffic stops, see, e.g., State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 23, 24-25 (2004) (adopting three-part test to determine when police officer’s questions

In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.

“To determine the sufficiency of an officer’s suspicion, we consider the articulable facts in light of all surrounding circumstances, keeping in mind that a trained officer may make inferences and draw conclusions from conduct that may seem unremarkable to an untrained observer.” State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 26 (2004).

To determine the sufficiency of an officer’s suspicion, we consider the articulable facts in light of all surrounding circumstances, keeping in mind that a trained officer may make inferences and draw conclusions from conduct that may seem unremarkable to an untrained observer.

A temporary detention is lawful, however, “if the police have an articulable suspicion that the person detained has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 22 (2004) (quotations and citations omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

The defendant argues that requiring reasonable and articulable suspicion would prevent the police from obtaining consent for random searches that are merely “fishing expedition^] trying to prove a crime that [the officer] had a hunch had been committed.” The State argues that concerns about police expanding the scope of routine traffic stops are adequately addressed in State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19 (2004).

State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 25 (2004) (recognizing that the purpose of Terry’s scope requirement is to prevent law enforcement officials from fundamentally altering the nature of the stop by converting it into a general inquisition about past, present and future wrongdoing, absent an independent basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause)