State of New Hampshire v. Marcie Janvrin

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2020-0132, State of New Hampshire v. Marcie
Janvrin, the court on March 18, 2021, issued the following
order:

Having considered the parties’ briefs and the record submitted on appeal,
we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R.
18(1).

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Marcie Janvrin, was convicted of
the felony offenses of possession of a controlled drug and falsifying physical
evidence. On appeal, she argues that, because the police stopped her after
observing that her vehicle had an invalid inspection sticker and then unlawfully
expanded the stop, the Trial Court (Schulman, J.) erred in denying her motion to
suppress. We affirm.

The trial court found the following facts. On the night before Seabrook
police stopped her, Massachusetts police reported to them that the defendant
and her vehicle were seen on a street in Lawrence, Massachusetts that was
known for “high drug activity.” After leaving Lawrence, the defendant made short
stops at three Seabrook residences; Seabrook police were familiar with the
occupants of the residences and knew that they were “presently involved with
drugs.” On the following night, Massachusetts police officers again observed the
defendant in an area in Lawrence known for illegal drug sales and drug activity.

A Massachusetts police officer then followed her to Seabrook where she
was stopped by Seabrook police. Prior to making the stop, an officer noticed the
inspection sticker on her vehicle had expired. The defendant spoke to the officer
through the vehicle’s back window because the front driver’s side window could
not be rolled down. When asked where she was coming from, the defendant
stated that she had been playing Keno. The officer knew this was untrue
because the Massachusetts police had followed her from Lawrence to Seabrook
and knew that she had not made any intermediate stops. When the officer
disclosed that he knew this was not true, the defendant offered another false
itinerary. After she was advised that police had followed her while she was in
Lawrence, the defendant stated that she went there to purchase crack and had
smoked it on her return trip to Seabrook. She also disclosed that there was a
crack pipe in the car and, when asked, gave the officer consent to seize it. The
officer also noticed a bulge in the defendant’s clothing. When he asked her
whether she had any illegal drugs on her, the defendant “put her hands down
her pants and removed a second crack pipe.” Apparent residue was visible on at
least one of the crack pipes.

The defendant was arrested. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing that
although the invalid inspection sticker provided a basis for the original traffic
stop, the police had no justification “to expand that routine traffic stop beyond
the time it took to resolve the alleged inspection sticker violation.” The trial court
denied her motion, ruling that there was “reasonable suspicion to stop defendant
for possible drug-related offenses (and for an expired inspection sticker) and the
scope of the stop never extended beyond the reasonable and articulable
suspicion.”

On appeal, the defendant concedes that there was reasonable suspicion to
seize her for driving with an invalid inspection sticker. She argues, however, that
the police unlawfully expanded the traffic stop by asking her “where she was
coming from, asking her to step out of the vehicle, and questioning her about
drug activity.” She cites both the State and Federal Constitutions to argue that
the expanded scope of the stop was unconstitutional. We first address her
claims under the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our
analysis. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983).

When we review a trial court’s order on a motion to suppress, we accept its
factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.
State v. Perez, 173 N.H. 251, 256 (2020). We conduct a de novo review of the
trial court’s legal conclusions. Id.

A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of both the state and federal
constitutions; its scope must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.
State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 22-23 (2004). It may be expanded to
investigate other illegal activity “only if the officer has a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot.” Perez, 173 N.H. at 257
(quotation omitted). To determine whether an officer’s inquiry unlawfully
expanded the scope of an otherwise valid traffic stop, we employ the following
analysis:

If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no
constitutional violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably
related to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the
law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no
constitutional violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable
connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable
suspicion, we must consider whether in light of all the

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 circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly
prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the
stop.

Id.

The defendant argues that “the police lacked reasonable suspicion to
pursue a drug investigation until the moment she admitted to buying and using
drugs prior to being stopped.” She contends that the State’s evidence of both
prior drug-related police contact with her and her presence in Lawrence in an
area known for high drug activity lacked sufficient detail to make it useful in a
reasonable suspicion analysis. We will assume without deciding that, at the time
that the police stopped the defendant, they lacked reasonable suspicion to
pursue a drug investigation.

In State v. McKinnon-Andrews, we addressed the scope of protections
provided by the State and Federal Constitutions on the duration and scope of an
investigatory stop. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. at 23-25. Observing that state
and federal courts disagreed on the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment, we adopted the approach taken by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 270 (Ill. 2003). Id. This approach
recognizes that police officers may engage in “facially innocuous dialog which a
detained motorist would not reasonably perceive as altering the fundamental
nature of the stop.” Id. at 25 (quotation omitted). Inquiries about a defendant’s
itinerary, including where she had been, have been described as “routine.” See
United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). In this case, the initial
question posed by the officer about the defendant’s travel falls within the routine
category, and was thus permissible.

The defendant challenges both the trial court’s finding that she was
asked to step out of her vehicle “to address the expired inspection sticker” and
its conclusion that the request “did not change the fundamental nature of the
stop.” She argues that the police had already communicated with her about
the expired inspection sticker through the rear window “without difficulty” and
that the absence of additional questions about the sticker after she exited the
vehicle supports her contention that the trial court erred when it found that
the exit request was to further address the invalid inspection sticker.

The trial court found that, at the time of the stop, “the police had
reasonable suspicion (but certainly not probable cause) that the defendant
might be in possession of drugs” which supported a brief Terry detention and
some brief questioning.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The court
further found that the expired inspection sticker provided “independent
reasonable suspicion for the stop.”

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 In this case, whether the basis for the exit request was to further
investigation of the expired inspection sticker or of possession of illegal drugs
does not alter our conclusion. See State v. McBreairty, 142 N.H. 12, 15 (1997)
(objective test applies when determining whether valid justification exists for
investigatory stop). The officer who initiated the stop testified at the
suppression hearing that, at the time that she was asked to exit the vehicle,
the defendant had already lied to him about her travel that night. The
statements of fact set forth in both of the parties’ briefs are consistent with this
testimony. The defendant’s dishonest response raised the officer’s suspicion.
This response, coupled with the officer’s knowledge that she had travelled on
both nights to an area “known for illegal drug sales” and, upon returning to
Seabrook on the previous night, stopped at multiple houses known for illegal
drug activity, provided the officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the defendant was engaged in illegal drug-related activity.

Because we conclude that the officer’s initial question about the
defendant’s itinerary did not alter the fundamental nature of the stop, and that
the defendant’s dishonest response, combined with other information known to
the officer, created reasonable suspicion that she was involved in illegal activity
before he expanded the scope of the stop, we find no violation of the State
Constitution. See McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. at 25-27. The Federal
Constitution provides no greater protection to the defendant under these
circumstances. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-02 (2005); Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); United States v. Dion, 859 F.3d 114,
123-28 (1st Cir. 2017). We therefore reach the same conclusion under the
Federal Constitution.
Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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