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We review a trial court’s decision to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

When applying this standard, “[o]ur task is not to determine whether we would have found differently,” but only “to determine whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court on the basis of the evidence before it.” Benoit v. Cerasaro, 169 N.H. 10, 19, 21 (2016).

Under that standard, “[o]ur task is not to determine whether we would have found differently,” but only “to determine whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court on the basis of the evidence before it.” Benoit v. Cerasaro, 169 N.H. 10, 21 (2016) (quotations omitted).

We will affirm the trial court’s equitable decision if the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain its discretionary judgment.

Under that standard, “[o]ur task is not to determine whether we would have found differently,” but only “to determine whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court on the basis of the evidence before it.” Benoit v. Cerasaro, 169 N.H. 10, 21 (2016) (quotations omitted).

In doing so, we determine whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

In reviewing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we consider evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

We review a trial court’s decision to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

gument, finding that, “[u]nder the statutory scheme, a former owner who does not pay his or her taxes and who also chooses not to repurchase his or her property suffers the loss of the property, but is still entitled to the excess proceeds of the municipality’s sale of the property.” We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We review the trial court’s decision to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Mellon, 169 N.H. 10 at 204 (“Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent.”).

The court has broad and flexible equitable powers which allow it to shape and adjust the precise relief to the requirements of the particular situation.

Given the Act's purpose to encourage employees to come forward, see Bio Energy, 135 N.H. at 523, 607 A.2d 606, and the court's broad and flexible equitable powers, Benoit v. Cerasaro, 169 N.H. 10, 20, 139 A.3d 1134 (2016), we see no reason why the legislature would limit the court's authority to address just a fraction of the prohibited conduct enumerated by the statute while providing the labor commissioner with the authority to address all of the prohibited conduct.

Yet, RSA 275-E:4, I, explicitly authorizes the labor commissioner to enjoin all of these unlawful activities by providing the remedy of “any appropriate injunctive relief.” Given the Act’s purpose to encourage employees to come forward, see Bio Energy, 135 N.H. at 523, and the court’s broad and flexible equitable powers, Benoit v. Cerasaro, 169 N.H. 10, 20 (2016), we see no reason why the legislature would limit the court’s authority to address just a fraction of the prohibited conduct enumerate

We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant equitable relief for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

“Our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently,” but is only “to 4 determine whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court on the basis of the evidence before it.” Benoit v. Cerasaro, 169 N.H. 10, 21 (2016) (quotation and brackets omitted).