Crossings at Sleepy Hollow Cooperative, Inc. v. Town of Newmarket

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0039, Crossings at Sleepy Hollow
Cooperative, Inc. v. Town of Newmarket, the court on November
29, 2022, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The plaintiff, Crossings at Sleepy Hollow Cooperative, Inc.,
appeals the order of the Superior Court (Ignatius, J.), following a bench trial,
affirming the decision of the defendant, the Town of Newmarket, to deny its
application for a tax abatement. See RSA 76:17 (Supp. 2021). The plaintiff
argues that an abatement is warranted on grounds of poverty and inability to
pay. We affirm.

The plaintiff is a cooperative association formed for the purpose of
owning and operating a manufactured housing park in the Town of
Newmarket. Members of the association own and reside in manufactured
homes placed on the property. In 2020, in response to a property tax increase,
the plaintiff applied for a tax abatement for the 2019 tax year. The plaintiff
asserted that an abatement was necessary because rent increases necessary to
pay the tax would have a negative impact on the low-to-moderate-income
residents of the park. After the town denied the application, the plaintiff
appealed to the superior court.

Absent an express statutory provision to the contrary, RSA 75:1 (Supp.
2021) requires municipalities to assess real property “at its market value.”
RSA 76:16 (Supp. 2021), however, permits municipalities to abate taxes levied
on real property “for good cause shown.” We have held that “poverty and
inability to pay are good cause for a tax abatement.” Ansara v. City of Nashua,
118 N.H. 879, 880 (1978) (quotation omitted).

A taxpayer aggrieved by the town’s denial of a tax abatement application
may appeal to the superior court, “which shall make such order thereon as
justice requires.” RSA 76:17. The superior court may abate taxes for any
cause that would justify an abatement by the town. LSP Assoc. v. Town of
Gilford, 142 N.H. 369, 374 (1997). The plaintiff bears the burden to show that
an abatement is justified. Ansara, 118 N.H. at 880. Tax abatement procedures
are equitable in nature. Porter v. Town of Sanbornton, 150 N.H. 363, 368
(2003). We will affirm the trial court’s equitable decision if the record
establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain its discretionary judgment.
Benoit v. Cerasaro, 169 N.H. 10, 19-20 (2016).
 The plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in finding that a 2021
income survey, which showed that the park is a low-to-moderate-income
community, was not representative of park residents. The trial court found
that eighty-six income surveys were delivered to the residents, one for each
occupied unit on the property, and that 47 responses were received, a response
rate of approximately 55 percent. The court credited the testimony of the
witness who conducted the survey, but noted that “[t]he record contains no
data concerning the income level of the 39 individuals or households that did
not respond to the survey.” Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, however, the
court did not expressly find that the income survey was not representative of
park residents. Rather, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to
show that a “blanket approach,” that is, an abatement benefitting all residents
regardless of income, is warranted, given that unit owners can apply for
individual abatements of taxes levied on their manufactured homes, rent
assistance, and elderly tax exemptions.

“[P]laintiffs who claim that they are entitled to an abatement because of
poverty and inability to pay, and who have some equity in their homes, must
show that it is not reasonable for them to relocate, refinance, or otherwise
obtain additional public assistance.” Ansara, 118 N.H. at 881. “Without such
a showing, the equities do not balance in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. Given the
court’s findings regarding other forms of assistance that are available to
residents on an individual basis, we find no error in its conclusion that the
income survey results do not justify an abatement benefitting all residents.
See Benoit, 169 N.H. at 19-20.

The plaintiff next argues that, given the town’s authority to abate taxes
“for good cause shown” pursuant to RSA 76:16, I, the trial court erred in ruling
that this case is one for the legislature, not the courts. However, the trial court
did not rule that this case is one for the legislature; rather, the court stated
that “to the extent” that the plaintiff argues that “all owner-occupied
manufactured housing cooperatives should receive preferential tax treatment,”
the plaintiff “should present that argument to the legislature.” (Emphasis
added.) See In re Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007) (matters of public policy are
reserved for the legislature); see also In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157
N.H. 698, 702 (2008) (interpretation of trial court order presents a question of
law for this court). As discussed below, the trial court also considered the
plaintiff’s arguments relating to this particular manufactured housing park.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling.

The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by allegedly ruling that
the recorded covenant requirement in RSA 75:1-a (2012), which applies to
multifamily residential rental property, also applies to manufactured housing
parks. We do not construe the court’s order to rule that the requirements of
RSA 75:1-a apply to manufactured housing parks. See Salesky, 157 N.H. at

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702. Rather, the court “assign[ed] significance to the existence of, and
requirements set forth in, RSA 75:1-a,” because the legislature, by enacting
RSA 75:1-a, “explicitly conferred preferential tax status to multifamily
residential rental property,” whereas it “has not chosen to confer the same
status on owner-occupied manufactured housing cooperatives.” By referencing
the recorded covenant requirement of RSA 75:1-a, the trial court was merely
contrasting that requirement for preferential tax treatment under RSA 75:1-a
with the lack of any provision of the plaintiff’s bylaws ensuring that the
membership consists solely of persons with low or moderate income. We find
no error in the court’s ruling. See In re Kilton, 156 N.H. at 645.

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by allegedly
construing its argument to apply to all manufactured housing cooperatives,
rather than to its particular case. The plaintiff asserts that “[t]he clear
testimony in this case was that [the plaintiff] was a community primarily
composed of low to moderate-income people.” It is clear from the trial court’s
order that it considered the facts relating to the plaintiff’s particular case. As
previously noted, the court found that “a significant number of [the plaintiff’s]
residents did not answer the income survey.” Moreover, the plaintiff’s
president, who opined that “a low to medium income would . . . describe the
majority” of residents, acknowledged that there are “obviously” exceptions.
Based upon the evidence, the court concluded that, “[t]o the extent [the
plaintiff] argues that it is uniquely positioned [for an abatement benefitting all
its members] based upon the income level of its residents, there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support that argument.” The record supports the trial
court’s conclusion. See Benoit, 169 N.H. at 19-20.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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