Cited by

at 650; Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 784-85 (2015).

Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 784 (2015).

The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted the DOJ’s cross-motion, concluding that its ruling was not precluded by the 2014 circuit court order and that the plaintiff had received 1 See Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777 (2015) (explaining that the “Laurie List” arose from the “well-recognized proposition that, in a criminal case, the State is obligated to disclose information favorable to the defendant that is material to either guilt or to punishment”).

rting the State’s disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence is clear in that it ‘is obligated to disclose information favorable to the defendant that is material to either guilt or punishment’”; an obligation that “‘arises from a defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law, and aims to ensure that defendants receive fair trials.’” (Quoting Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777 (2015)).

[¶18] The plaintiff asserts, and we agree, that this case is factually similar to Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774 (2015).

Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777-80 (2015); Gantert v. City of Rochester, 168 N.H. 640, 645-47 (2016).

Compare Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777 (2015) (due process guarantees disclosure of “information favorable to the defendant that is material to either guilt or punishment”), with State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826 (1991) (right to produce all proofs favorable entitles defendant “only to testimony that is both material and favorable to his defense” (emp

Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777 (2015); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

We provide a detailed discussion of the purpose and origin of the “Laurie List” in Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777-79 (2015).

In Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774 (2015), we recognized the link between RSA 105:13-b and the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure under Brady and Laurie: “Although the prosecutorial duty.

As amended in 2012, RSA 105:13-b “explicitly codifies the distinction we have recognized between exculpatory evidence that must be disclosed to the defendant under the State and Federal Constitutions, and other information contained in a confidential personnel file that may be obtained through the procedure set forth in paragraph III of RSA 105:13-b.” Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 781 (2015) (quotation, ellipsis, and brackets omitted); compare RSA 105:13-b, with RSA 105

Duchesne v. Hillsborough County 4 Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777-80 (2015); Gantert v. City of Rochester, 168 N.H. 640, 645-47 (2016).

Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 775 (2015) (officers brought request for declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called “Laurie List” in the superior court, rather than the circuit court); Gantert v. City of Rochester, 168 N.H. 640, 642 (2016) (officer brought several claims arising out of his allegedly wrongful pla

See, e.g., Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 781 (2015) (describing procedure, as set forth by statute, for distinguishing between material in police personnel file that may be disclosed and material that must remain confidential).

4 II We have recently explained the background and operation of “Laurie Lists.” See Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777-82 (2015).