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To determine whether a statute is susceptible to a constitutional construction, we apply our traditional principles of statutory interpretation and consider the intent of the legislature “as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013) (emphasis added).

Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013) (explaining that we interpret a statute’s language in light of the policy the statutory scheme sought to advance).

Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013) (“We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did 8 not see fit to include.”).

We interpret the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

We do not, however, consider words and phrases in isolation when interpreting statutes, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole.

Moreover, we construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust result.

We examine the words and phrases not in isolation, but, rather, within the context of the statute as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.

Because the language of RSA 259:125, II is plain and unambiguous, and because we will not add language that the legislature did not see fit to include, see Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013), we hold that the trial court erred when it construed paragraph II to apply to ALS proceedings under RSA 265:A-31.

We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

luntary emergency admission occurs when the receiving facility “accepts a patient for mental-health treatment on an inpatient basis against his or her will because of a sudden or unexpected occurrence demanding prompt action.” The defendant’s interpretation rests upon construing certain words in isolation, instead of in context, which is contrary to our statutory interpretation principles.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

I. Background The NHRS is a tax qualified pension trust for public employees.

“In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent.

“In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013).

Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013) 4 (stating that statutory interpretation presents a question of law which we review de novo).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

2 We review the superior court’s statutory interpretation de novo.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.

"Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo."

This enables us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme.

We discern legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

“In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013).

“In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

Because Roland has failed to provide a transcript of the Department hearing, we must assume that the evidence was sufficient to support these findings.

*120 In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

This argument requires us to construe RSA 170-C:5, *774 Ill and RSA 169-C:28, a task for which we employ a de novo standard of review.

“Because RSA chapter 100-A does not provide for judicial review, a writ of certiorari is the sole remedy available to a party aggrieved by a decision of the NHRS.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. ___, ___, 82 A.3d 917, 920 (2013) (quotations omitted).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.