In the Matter of Carter & Carter

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

6th Circuit Court-Concord Family Division
Case No. 2023-0014
Citation: In the Matter of Carter & Carter, 2024 N.H. 30

IN THE MATTER OF BRADLEY CARTER AND RACHEL CARTER

Argued: September 21, 2023
Opinion Issued: June 6, 2024

Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C., of Manchester (Michael G. Eaton and
Christine A. Gordon on the brief, and Michael G. Eaton orally), for the
petitioner.

The Crisp Law Firm, PLLC, of Concord (Jack P. Crisp, Jr. on the brief
and orally), for the respondent.

HANTZ MARCONI, J.

¶1 The respondent, Rachel Carter (mother), and the petitioner, Bradley
Carter (father), divorced in 2020 and are the parents of two children. The
mother appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Hersh, J.) that modified her
supervised visits with her children and denied her requests for additional
parenting time and unsupervised visits. We vacate and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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¶2 We draw the following facts from the trial court’s order or the
contents of the record before us. Around the time of the divorce, the mother
had an alcohol use disorder. The final parenting plan gave sole decision-
making authority and primary residential responsibility to the father. The
mother was granted a two-hour supervised visit with her children twice a
month at a visitation center, when it was convenient for the father.

¶3 The parties followed this routine for some time until their visitation
center was about to close. Because of the approaching closure and her two
years of sobriety, the mother requested unsupervised visits and weekends with
her children. The father objected. Following a temporary hearing, the Circuit
Court (Lemire, J.) issued an order in which it observed that the mother sought
to substantially increase her parenting time. It noted that “[t]he only section of
RSA 461-A:11, I[,] which the [mother] possibly could argue applies with respect
to her Motion to Change Parenting Plan is RSA 461-A:11, I(c).” See RSA 461-
A:11, I(c) (2018) (providing that a court can modify a parent’s rights and
responsibilities if it “finds by clear and convincing evidence” that the children’s
“present environment is detrimental” to their health and the benefit to them
outweighs the harm that a change in environment will likely cause). It then
sent the parties to mediation.

¶4 The parties’ mediation proved unsuccessful. As a result, they
proceeded to a final hearing. There, the mother requested two modifications of
her parental rights and responsibilities: unsupervised parenting time and an
expansion of her parenting time. Regarding her request for expanded
parenting time, she contended that the children’s “present environment” was
detrimental to the children because of their irregular contact with her and their
limited ability to see her. The Circuit Court (Hersh, J.) denied her request,
explaining that she did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
children’s present environment is detrimental to their physical, mental, or
emotional health. See RSA 461-A:11, I(c). It also maintained the schedule of
two, two-hour supervised visits with the mother per month with a mutually
agreeable supervisor, thereby implicitly denying her request for unsupervised
visitation. The mother appealed.

II

¶5 We will not overturn a trial court’s denial of a request to modify an
order regarding parental rights and responsibilities unless it clearly appears
that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion. See In the Matter of
Summers & Summers, 172 N.H. 474, 478-79 (2019). Thus, we review only
whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the

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discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court’s
determination if it could have reasonably been made. Id. at 479.

¶6 We first address the mother’s argument that the trial court erred
when it determined that the mother failed to meet her burden under RSA 461-
A:11, I(c) regarding her request for expanded parenting time. Specifically, the
mother argues that the trial court improperly narrowed its “present
environment” inquiry to the children’s routine with the father and failed to
consider other factors, including the infrequency of their contact with their
mother.

¶7 Determining whether the trial court properly interpreted “present
environment” requires that we interpret RSA 461-A:11, I(c). We review the trial
court’s statutory interpretation de novo. Summers, 172 N.H. at 479. When
interpreting a statute, we first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if
possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
Doe v. Attorney General, 175 N.H. 349, 352 (2022). We interpret the statute as
written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add
language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. The legislature is
not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and, whenever
possible, every word of a statute should be given effect. Id. We construe all
parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd
or unjust result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in
isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id.

¶8 RSA 461-A:11 states in part:

I. The court may issue an order modifying a permanent
order concerning parental rights and responsibilities under any of
the following circumstances:
...
(c) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the child’s present environment is detrimental to the
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health, and the
advantage to the child of modifying the order outweighs the
harm likely to be caused by a change in environment.

RSA 461-A:11, I(c).

¶9 The term “present environment” is not defined in RSA chapter
461-A. When a term is not defined in a statute, we look to its common usage,
using the dictionary for guidance. Bedford Sch. Dist. v. State of N.H., 171 N.H.
246, 250 (2018). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “environment” as “a
particular set of surroundings or conditions which something or someone
exists in or interacts with.” Oxford English Dictionary, https://

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www.oed.com/dictionary/environment_n?tab=meaning_and_use# 5307111
(last visited June 4, 2024). “Present” is defined as “[e]xisting or occurring
now.” Id. at https://www.oed.com/dictionary/present_adj?tab=meaning_and
_use#28601263 (last visited June 4, 2024). Accordingly, the plain meaning of
“present environment” is the surroundings or conditions in which the children
now exist.

¶10 This broad definition comports with the policy underlying the
statutory scheme. See Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013) (explaining
that we interpret a statute’s language in light of the policy the statutory scheme
sought to advance). RSA 461-A:2 provides that “children do best when both
parents have a stable and meaningful involvement in their lives.” RSA 461-A:2,
I (2018). With that principle in mind, the policy of the state is to “[s]upport
frequent and continuing contact between each child and both parents” and to
“[e]ncourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their
children” unless it would be detrimental to the children. RSA 461-A:2, I(a)-(b).
Similarly, RSA 461-A:6 requires that when determining parental rights and
responsibilities, the court shall be guided by the child’s best interests. RSA
461-A:6, I (Supp. 2023). When doing so, it must consider, among other things,
each parent’s relationship with the child and ability to provide the child with
“nurture, love, affection, and guidance,” to meet the child’s developmental
needs, and to foster and support a positive relationship with the other parent
and between the child and the other parent. RSA 461-A:6, I(a), (c), (e), (f), (g).
Such policies inform the broad definition of “present environment.”

¶11 Viewing the plain meaning of “present environment” in the context
of RSA chapter 461-A, we conclude that the children’s “present environment” is
determined by assessing the surroundings or conditions in which the children
now exist. That assessment includes their daily activities, mental and
emotional states, and their needs. Consequently, when assessing a child’s
“present environment,” the court must consider a range of factors that
contribute to the child’s wellbeing.

¶12 Nevertheless, the father, relying upon our decision in In the Matter
of Summers & Summers, 172 N.H. 474, 480-81 (2019), contends that concerns
over the mother’s sobriety, alone, suffice to deny her request for additional
parenting time. We disagree. The mother’s sobriety, or lack thereof, is but one
of many factors comprising the children’s present environment that the trial
court must consider. Because it is unclear whether the trial court applied the
broad definition of “present environment” stated above when assessing the
mother’s request to expand her parenting time, we vacate the trial court’s order
denying her request for a modification of parenting time and remand for the
trial court to reconsider her request consistent with this decision. See In re
Jessie E., 137 N.H. 336, 343 (1993).

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 [¶13] Next, the mother challenges the trial court’s denial of her request
for unsupervised visitation. Specifically, she argues that the court should have
evaluated her proposal for unsupervised parenting time under RSA 461-A:11, II
because her proposal would modify the parenting plan, not the parenting
schedule. See Summers, 172 N.H. at 483; RSA 461-A:1, VI, VII (Supp. 2023)
(defining “parenting plan” and “parenting schedule”). The father counters that
this issue is not preserved because the mother did not cite that section of the
statute in the trial court. Because we are vacating the trial court’s denial of the
mother’s request for additional parenting time, we also vacate the court’s denial
of her request for unsupervised visitation. On remand, the parties may clarify
the statutory basis for the relief they are requesting.

¶14 In light of our decision on the mother’s first two arguments, we
need not address her other arguments. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s
denial of the mother’s requests for unsupervised visitation and expanded
parenting time and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Vacated and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

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