Cited by

Further, we conclude that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights because the trial court’s failure to dismiss the indictment resulted in the defendant’s conviction.

Ct. R. 16-A; State v. Morrill, 169 N.H. 709, 720 (2017) (reviewing an unpreserved sufficiency of the evidence challenge under plain error); State v. Houghton, 168 N.H. 269, 272 (2015) (reviewing an unpreserved sufficiency of the evidence challenge under plain error); State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 380 (2011) (reviewing an unpreserved sufficiency of the evidence challenge to an AFSA conviction under plain error); State v. Lopez, 162 N.H. 153, 159 (2011) (reviewing an unpreserved sufficiency of the

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 380 (2011) (concluding that the defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence of penetration was not preserved where the defendant argued before the trial court “that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt because [the victim’s] testimony was ‘inconsistent,’ not that the State had failed to prove di

lement of the crimes; namely, that the defendant produced, promoted, or contributed to the delinquency of A, B, and C. State v. Houghton, 168 N.H. 269, 274 (2015); see RSA 169-B:41, I. We also “conclude that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights because the trial court’s failure to dismiss the charge at the close of the evidence led to his conviction on the charge.” State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 384 (2011).

Ct. R. 16-A; State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 380-84 (2011) (holding that defendant’s conviction on aggravated felonious sexual assault charge in the absence of sufficient evidence of penetration amounted to a plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights).

Ct. R. 16-A; see State v. Leroux, 175 N.H. 204, 210 (2022) (declining to address issue as plain error when the defendant failed to raise plain error rule); but cf. State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 380-84 (2011) (holding that conviction on felony charge of aggravated felonious sexual assault based on insufficient evidence amounted to plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights).

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 381 (2011); see also State v. Houghton, 168 N.H. 269, 273-74 (2015).

With respect to the remaining records, the court determined that they were “not discoverable” and ordered that they “remain under seal.” We review the trial court’s decision for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

We must determine whether the trial 12 court’s rulings on this discovery issue were clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

We review a trial court’s ruling on the management of discovery to determine whether its decision is sustainable.

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 380 (2011) (stating that, to find plain error, there must be error).

A trial court should release confidential information only if it is essential and reasonably necessary to the defense at trial.

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 385 (2011) (defendant entitled to information “essential and reasonably necessary to the defense at trial”).

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 385 (2011) (defendant entitled to information “essential and reasonably necessary to the defense at trial”).

“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 383 (2011).

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 385 (2011) (defendant entitled to information “essential and reasonably necessary to the defense at trial”).

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 385 (2011) (defendant entitled to information “essential and reasonably necessary to the defense at trial”).

We review a trial court’s decision on the management of discovery and the admissibility of evidence under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.

For there to be plain error, the defendant must first establish that there was error; that is, he must establish that the evidence in fact was insufficient to sustain his conviction.

It further explained, in both orders, that the court first must evaluate whether it is proper to order an in camera review of the requested records and, if so, upon review, it must then determine whether the records contain information that is “essential and reasonably necessary” to the defense at trial.

We use our plain error standard of review with regard to the remaining charges.

“Mistrial is the proper remedy only if the evidence or comment complained of was not merely improper, but also so prejudicial that it constituted an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions.” State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 378 (2011) (quotation omitted).

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 384 (2011) (“Plain is synonymous with clear or, equivalently, obvious.” (quotation omitted)).

On appeal, the defendant argues in essence, as he argued before the trial court, that the court erred when it denied the motion for a mistrial because “the image of a family member of the victim expressing animosity toward him could not be erased by a jury instruction.” We find State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375 (2011), to be instructive.

“Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 381 (2011) (quotation omitted).

“We will not overturn the trial court’s decision on whether a mistrial or other remedial action is necessary absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 378 (2011) (quotation omitted).

A mistrial is appropriate “only if the evidence or comment complained of was not merely improper, but also so prejudicial that it constituted an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions.” State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 378 (2011) (quotation omitted).

State v. Guay, 162 N.H. 375, 385 (2011); accord Com.

We review the trial court’s decision on the management of discovery under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.