Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Gray v. Kelly, 13 A.3d 848.

28 citing documents.

  • John Doe v. New Hampshire Division of State Police & a. N.H. 2025
    Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (stating that collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense); Super.
  • State of New Hampshire v. Anthony Kinney N.H. 2024
    Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant raised this issue in the trial court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.
  • K.A. v. D.A. N.H. 2023
    Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164-65 (2010) (explaining doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel); Taylor v. Nutting, 133 N.H. 451, 454-57 (1990) (explaining doctrine of law of the case).
  • In the Matter of Lura Sanborn and Jeffrey Bart N.H. 2021
    Accordingly, “where a final order replaces a previously issued temporary order, the temporary order remains in effect during the pendency of any appeal unless the trial court specifically orders that the final order should remain in effect pending resolution of the appeal.” Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 167 (2010).
  • In the Matter of Brian Whyte and Rebecca Whyte N.H. 2021
    Div. R. 2.29 (providing that alimony and uniform support orders “are effective upon the issuance of the clerk’s notice of decision, unless the court specifies, either orally or in writing, another effective date”); Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 167-68 (2010) (holding that a trial court order becomes effective on the date it is rendered unless a party files an appeal or obtains a stay).
  • Marcella Paul-Roc & a. v. Matthew Demio N.H. 2020
    They argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion to hold the order “in abeyance.” However, by filing their appeal and adding the costs issues to it, the order was effectively stayed as a matter of law.
  • Riverbend Condo Association v. Groundhog Landscaping and Property Maintenance, Inc. N.H. 2020
    Generally, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we consider whether the petitioner’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.
  • Jerry Perry v. Patricia Brown N.H. 2020
    However, the respondent’s timely appeal stayed the trial court’s order from taking effect, see Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 167-68 (2010); Prob.
  • Koleen Crawford & a. v. Town of Gilford N.H. 2019
    Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 167-68 (2010) (addressing when time to retrieve property began); accord In the 3 Matter of Eckroate-Breagy & Breagy, 170 N.H. 247, 250 (2017) (“generally a decree issued by the trial court does not go to final judgment if a timely appeal is taken”).
  • In the Matter of Tanya Braga-Pillsbury and Mickey Pillsbury N.H. 2019
    Ordinarily, a temporary order remains in effect during the pendency of any appeal of a final divorce decree, unless the trial court specifically orders that the final decree should take effect during the pendency of any appeal.
  • Nicole Pittore v. Dan LeBlanc & a. N.H. 2018
    See, e.g., Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164-67 (2010) (holding that doctrine of res judicata barred action for recovery of personal property when plaintiff had opportunity to litigate his right to the property in prior domestic violence proceeding).
  • Jeff's General Service Corporation v. AAA Pool & Spa Builders N.H. 2018
    Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164-67 (2010) (applying doctrine of res judicata).
  • John F. Best, Jr. v. Nationstar Mortgage & a. N.H. 2017
    We review the trial court’s decision de novo.
  • David Eldridge & a. v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC & a. N.H. 2017
    “The doctrine of res judicata prevents parties from relitigating matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action.” Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (quotation omitted).
  • Josephine Amatucci v. Jared Welman & a. N.H. 2016
    The doctrine of res judicata prevents parties from relitigating matters that were litigated, or could have been litigated, in a prior action.
  • Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry 125 A.3d 362 N.H. 2015
    In re Estate of Bergquist, 166 N.H. 531, 535 (2014); Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010).
  • In the Matter of Gabrielle Muller and William Muller N.H. 2015
    Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 167-68 (2010); Rollins v. Rollins, 122 N.H. 6, 10 (1982); see also Fam.
  • Olga Edstrom v. Mount Saint Mary's Condominium Association N.H. 2015
    The court observed that res judicata “is not a jurisdictional defense” and reasoned that, because the respondent had “raised no arguments that avoid the finality” of the court’s prior orders, the court had “no choice but to enforce its final judgment in favor of Petitioner.” See Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (stating that both res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses); Super.
  • David D. Vandenberg v. Judith Hamilton N.H. 2015
    ition, in his reply brief, he requests that we “exercise [our] original jurisdiction over this cause to consider and rule on measures to protect the minor [in the parenting case] from sexual abuse.” Generally, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we consider whether the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.
  • George Maroun, Sr. & a. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 167 N.H. 220 N.H. 2014
    Singer Asset Finance Co. v. Wyner, 156 N.H. 468, 472 (2007) (“It is a long-standing rule that parties may not have judicial review of matters not raised in the forum of trial.” (quotation omitted)); see also Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (stating that both res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses); Super.
  • New Hampshire Attorney General v. Bass Victory Committee 166 N.H. 796 N.H. 2014
    “Generally, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we consider whether the [plaintiff’s] allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (quotation omitted).
  • In re C.M. & a. 103 A.3d 1192 N.H. 2014
    Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (“Res judicata...
  • James Yager v. K. William Clauson & a. 166 N.H. 570 N.H. 2014
    “Generally, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we consider whether the petitioner’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (quotation omitted).
  • In the Matter of Marcus J. Hampers and Kristin C. Hampers 166 N.H. 422 N.H. 2014
    “The doctrine of res judicata prevents parties from relitigating matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action.” Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (quotation omitted).
  • Appeal of Morrissey 70 A.3d 465 N.H. 2013
    The doctrine applies if three elements are met: (1) the parties are the same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action was before the court in both instances; and (3) the first action ended with a final judgment on the merits.
  • Appeal of Stewart 64 A.3d 989 N.H. 2013
    Appeal of Gallant, 125 N.H. 832, 835 (1984) (we will not interpret RSA chapter 282-A in a manner that would deny unemployment benefits to a faultless claimant); Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 166 (2010) (we construe statutes to avoid absurd or unjust results).
  • Appeal of Town of Seabrook 44 A.3d 518 N.H. 2012
    previously determined in [the 1984 decision], DES should have required NextEra to establish that the changes are not barred by [collateral estoppel, res judicata, or finality].” “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such a party[,] from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.” Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (quotation omitted).
  • In Re Kalar 27 A.3d 756 N.H. 2011
    Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 164 (2010) (quotation omitted).