In the Matter of Tanya Braga-Pillsbury and Mickey Pillsbury

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2018-0560, In the Matter of Tanya Braga-
Pillsbury and Mickey Pillsbury, the court on March 14, 2019,
issued the following order:

To the extent that the respondent requests in his brief that we find the
petitioner’s previous appeal of the trial court’s final order frivolous and impose
penalties pursuant to RSA 490:14-a (2010), his requests are untimely.

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The respondent, Mickey Pillsbury (husband), appeals an order of the
Circuit Court (Yazinski, J.) granting a motion for reconsideration by the
petitioner, Tanya Braga-Pillsbury (wife), in connection with the parties’ divorce.
He contends that the trial court erred by concluding that its temporary order
regarding alimony remained in force during the pendency of the wife’s prior
appeal of its final decree. We will uphold a trial court’s decision on a motion for
reconsideration absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In the Matter of
Geraghty & Geraghty, 169 N.H. 404, 419 (2016).

In this case, the parties agree that the trial court issued a temporary order
requiring the husband to pay the wife alimony. On January 9, 2017, the
husband moved to modify or eliminate alimony. On September 25, 2017, the
trial court issued final orders that provided for no alimony. The trial court did
not rule upon the husband’s motion to eliminate alimony from the temporary
order. Nor did the trial court rule that the final order would become the
temporary order upon any appeal.

On November 13, 2017, the wife filed a notice of appeal with this court.
On December 13, 2017, the husband moved, in the trial court, to make the final
decree a temporary order during the pendency of the appeal; the trial court
denied the motion on January 3, 2018. On May 3, 2018, the husband moved in
the trial court for a ruling regarding alimony, and, on June 28, 2018, the trial
court granted his motion to terminate temporary alimony. On July 26, 2018, the
trial court granted the wife’s motion to reconsider and reinstated the temporary
alimony on the basis that the appeal deprived it of jurisdiction.

The wife’s notice of appeal raised 15 questions, including at least one
regarding the final order’s lack of alimony and several regarding the division of
marital property. Her brief, however, addressed only the division of marital
property. The husband did not cross-appeal. On July 26, 2018, we affirmed.

Ordinarily, a temporary order remains in effect during the pendency of any
appeal of a final divorce decree, unless the trial court specifically orders that the
final decree should take effect during the pendency of any appeal. Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 167 (2010); Fam. Div. R. 2.29(B)(4) (stating that if appeal filed,
temporary and alimony orders continue in effect at least until this court issues
mandate). While, in appropriate cases, a trial court may order that a final decree
shall take effect during the pendency of an appeal, the general rule remains that
timely appealing a trial court’s final order stays it from taking effect. Gray, 161
N.H. at 167-68.

After an appeal has been perfected, this court is vested with the exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings, and the trial court’s
control over the proceeding is suspended. Rautenberg v. Munnis, 107 N.H. 446,
447 (1966). The trial court is limited to acting upon collateral, subsidiary, or
independent matters affecting the case and preserving the status quo. Id. at 448;
cf. Rollins v. Rollins, 122 N.H. 6, 10 (1982) (stating party’s recourse regarding
orders in effect during appeal is to obtain stay of order in trial court or supreme
court); Sup. Ct. R. 7-A (governing motion to stay trial court order during appeal).

The husband argues that because the wife did not brief any argument
concerning the lack of alimony in the trial court’s final order, that alimony was
“never appealed at all.” However, he does not cite, nor are we aware of, any
authority establishing that a trial court retains piecemeal jurisdiction over issues
not raised in an appeal during the appeal’s pendency. To the extent that the
husband argues that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that the lower court would
have put the final orders in effect pending appeal if it had known that” the wife
was not going to brief any issues regarding the lack of alimony on appeal, he
provides no support for this speculation. Furthermore, the record does not
reflect that prior to the wife’s appeal the husband requested that the trial court
make its final decree a temporary order pending an appeal.

The husband argues that the trial court had broad discretion in awarding
alimony. However, it has no authority to act beyond its jurisdiction during an
appeal. See Rautenberg, 107 N.H. at 448.

We conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its
discretion when it granted the wife’s motion to reconsider. See Geraghty, 169
N.H. at 419. In light of this order, we decline the husband’s request that “he be
excused” from paying the alimony due under the temporary order during the
pendency of the wife’s appeal. To the extent that the husband invites us to
“clarify” our opinion in Rollins, we see no need to do so.

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 Any remaining issues raised by the husband in his brief are not sufficiently
developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003), or otherwise do not
warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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