Cited by

Because the trial court ruled on the admissibility of the challenged evidence before trial, we consider only the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing.

As a general rule, a contemporaneous objection to a jury instruction is necessary to preserve the issue for appellate review.

We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an unsustainable exercise of discretion and will reverse only if they were clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

We so limit our review to avoid the pitfall of justifying the court’s pretrial ruling upon the defendant’s response at trial to the evidence.” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 573 (2010) (quotations and citation omitted).

We review the trial court’s ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

Because the trial court ruled on the admissibility of the challenged evidence before trial, we consider only the arguments and evidence presented at the pretrial hearing.

Remarks in opening statements may trigger the “opening the door” doctrine.

We so limit our review to avoid the pitfall of justifying the court’s ruling upon the defendant’s response at trial to the evidence.

See, e.g., State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 579-80 (2010) (discussing the specific contradiction doctrine and whether rebuttal evidence specifically contradicted the admitted evidence).

As a general rule, a contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a jury instruction issue for appellate review.

The State bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of uncharged conduct under Rule 404(b).

With respect to the issues on which we are reviewing the trial court’s pre-trial rulings, we limit our review to the proffers presented to the court before each ruling.

Because we are reviewing the trial court’s pretrial rulings, we limit our review to the proffers presented to the court at the pretrial motion hearing.

Barr, 172 N.H. at 692-93; State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 579-80 (2010).

As a general rule, a contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a jury instruction issue for appellate review.

We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

Remarks in opening statements may trigger the “opening the door” doctrine.

State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 575-76 (2010) (upholding trial court’s decision when it reached the correct result on mistaken grounds because “valid alternative grounds support [its] decision” (quotation omitted)); cf. State v. Sawyer, 145 N.H. 704, 706 (2001) (explaining that we would decide, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct

The plaintiff contends that the defendant’s opening statement opened the door, see State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 579 (2010) (stating that opening statement can open door to otherwise inadmissible evidence), and that the doctrine of specific contradiction entitled her to additional discovery.

As we have often explained, a specific, contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a challenge to a jury instruction for appellate review.

Consequently, we review the trial court's decision to admit evidence under the "opening the door" doctrine using our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.

State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 577 (2010); Berliner v. Clukay, 150 N.H. 80, 84-85 (2003); Chadwick v. CSI, Ltd., 137 N.H. 515, 520-21 (1993).

Unfair prejudice is not mere detriment to a defendant from the tendency of the evidence to prove guilt.

aised in the trial court, and arguments in support of claims or issues, which he contends need not be raised, we have held that within the context of jury instructions, a litigant must do more than “debate possible instructions with the trial court,” but must “actually make a specific objection to the court’s jury instructions.” State v. 2 Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 577 (2010) (emphasis added).

“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 574 (2010).

We review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, reversing only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 575 (2010) (finding no unfair prejudice in light of other evidence admitted).

The challenged testimony in this case did not provide evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” governed by Rule 404(b), but rather described an act that was inextricably intertwined with the charged offense because the acts were “part of a single criminal episode,” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 574 (2010) (quotation omitted), and describing the digital penetration was necessary to complete the story of the charged sexual intercourse.

“Unfair prejudice is not, of course, mere detriment to a defendant from the tendency of the evidence to prove guilt, in which sense all evidence offered by the prosecution is meant to be prejudicial.” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 574 (2010).

of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 574 (2010).

Therefore, any such argument is not preserved for our review.

State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 574 (2010) (quotation omitted).

Nor can we look to the State’s proffered justifications as valid alternative grounds to support the trial court’s ruling.

See, e.g., State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 574 (2010); State v. Addison, 160 N.H. 493, 501 (2010); see also State v. McGlew, 139 N.H. 505, 507-10 (1995).

However, we have also held that “where the trial court reaches the correct result on mistaken grounds, we will affirm if valid alternative grounds support the decision.” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 575-76 (2010) (quotation omitted).

State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 575-76, 8 A.3d 136 (2010) (quotation omitted).

We review the trial court’s ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

Although Sanborn’s testimony that the defendant threatened to kill Jennifer may have been prejudicial, “we cannot conclude that the evidence was so inflammatory as to substantially outweigh its probative value.” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 575 (2010) (quotation omitted).

“To preserve a jury instruction issue for our review, counsel must do more than merely submit proposed instructions to the trial court....” State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 577 (2010).