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As the defendant recognizes, under the last antecedent rule of statutory construction, “a modifying clause [in a statute] is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation.” State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 292 (2012) (quotation omitted).

The defendant, Joseph Mills, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Messer, J.) denying his motion to dismiss a charge of kidnapping, see RSA 633:1, I(d) (2016), pursuant to the merger doctrine, see State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 292-96 (2012); State v. Casanova, 164 N.H. 563, 566-69 (2013).

Although the defendant argues that this court adopted the merger doctrine for “restraint offense” in State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 294 (2012), that case involved a kidnapping conviction.

We review the trial court’s ruling on an alleged discovery violation for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

Labrie, 171 N.H. at 484 n.3; see also State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 292 (2012) (stating that the “rule of lenity serves as a guide for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent unambiguously” (quotation omitted)).

State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 292 (2012) (stating that the “rule of lenity serves as a guide for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent unambiguously” (quotation omitted)).

We will not consider the admissibility of Isenschmid’s testimony “under a standard the defendant has not argued.” State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 282 (2012).

equired to prove either: (1) that he (a) believed that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or was about to be instituted, (b) concealed or removed an AR-15 rifle, and (c) had a purpose to impair the rifle’s verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation, see RSA 641:6, I; or (2) that he was an accomplice to Tristan Stone, who committed such conduct, see State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 289 (2012) (language in an indictment alleging that a defendant “acted in concert with

State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 289 (2012); State v. Sinbandith, 143 N.H. 579, 584 (1999) (finding that language in an indictment charging the defendant with knowingly selling a controlled drug “in concert with and aided by another” provided sufficient notice that the defendant was being charged as a principal).

State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 275-76 (2012) (defendant convicted of capital murder involving solicitation, capital murder in the course of kidnapping, first degree murder as an accomplice, and conspiracy to commit capital murder).

Because the statute is clear on its face, we need not look to the legislative history or consider the rule of lenity.

We review de novo a trial court’s interpretation of a statute.

I. Confrontation Clause We review the defendant’s Confrontation Clause challenge de novo.

‘We review challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard and reverse only if the rulings are clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of a party’s case.” State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 283 (2012) (quotation omitted).

ny that he had interacted with Rivera before the night in question,” and “may have provided additional reasonable doubt about the State’s theory of the case.” “We review challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard and reverse only if the rulings are clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of a party’s case.” State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 283 (2012) (quotation omitted).

We review Confrontation Clause challenges de novo.

Because we find no ambiguity in RSA 637:11,11(b), the rule of lenity does not apply.

To rectify this overlap, we recently adopted the “merger doctrine.” See State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 294-95 (2012).

RSA 259:125, II defines “way,” in pertinent part, as “any privately owned and maintained way open for public use.” The sole issue on appeal is whether Alderberry Lane is “open for public use” and, therefore, a “way.” The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we decide de novo.