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The defendants maintain that the State’s construction of the Act “raises a host of constitutional free speech issues.” The State disagrees and argues that the trial court erred “when it found that the State’s interpretation and application of the Act was overbroad, vague, and violated the defendants’ right to freedom of speech.” [¶15] We review questions of constitutional law de novo.

He urges us to adopt the definition of “substantially benefit” that we set forth in State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 201 (2009), to define the term “to benefit” as used in RSA 643:1.

The plaintiff attached to his complaint the Nashua Telegraph article cited in the defendants’ mailer, which plainly states: “[The plaintiff] is a lawyer (although he was suspended from practicing law for a period).” Nowhere in this article, nor in the supreme court decision also cited by the mailer, see State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187 (2009), does the word “disbarred” appear.

Litigation is objectively baseless if no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.

“A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand the conduct it prohibits; or (2) it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 200 (2009).

generally State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 196 (2009) (finding that defendant failed “to explain exactly how his threatened [Consumer Protection Act] claim fits within the statutory language conferring private-party standing upon only those ‘injured by another’s use of any method, act or practice declared unlawful.’”); Appeal of Richards, 134 N.H. 148, 155 (1

Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the applicable statutes, which presents a question of law that we review de novo.

State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 205 (2009) (“As a general rule, we will not consider grounds of objections not specified or called to the court’s attention at the trial.

We first address Doyle’s facial challenge.

We first address Doyle's facial challenge.

In other words, we will not hold a statute to be unconstitutional unless a clear and substantial conflict exists between it and the constitution.” State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 199-200 (2009) (citations omitted).

Further, we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language it did not see fit to include.

Further, we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language it did not see fit to include.

Further, we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language it did not see fit to include.