Cited by

To the extent the plaintiffs contend that the insufficient notice violated their due process rights by citing Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632 (2007), we conclude that any such argument is undeveloped.

In re Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 637-38 (2007) (explaining that to determine whether particular procedures satisfy the requirements of due process, “we ascertain whether a legally protected interest has been implicated”); see also Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464 (concluding that an inmate has “no constitutional or inherent right” to commutation of his lif

In re Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007) (matters of public policy are reserved for the legislature); see also In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 702 (2008) (interpretation of trial court order presents a question of law for this court).

ch will result in patients being transported outside of their communities to receive necessary care.” Ultimately, she argues that our construction “will exacerbate the problems currently facing the mental-health system, likely render the system nonfunctional, and harm the individuals RSA chapter 135-C is designed to help.” The defendant’s public policy arguments are made in the wrong forum.

Therefore, to the extent that the petitioner argues that, as a matter of public policy, courts should not be able to order forfeiture for breach of a condition other than failure to appear, it makes its argument in the wrong forum.

To the extent the petitioner argues the policy concerns relating to the mentally ill require a new, different or heightened standard, we observe that matters of public policy are best suited for the legislature, and we therefore leave the task of addressing the petitioner’s concerns to that branch of the government.

Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007) (stating matters of public policy are reserved for the legislature).

See, e.g., Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007).

See, e.g., Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645, 939 A.2d 198 (2007).

3 Although there may be merit to Roland’s argument that it is preferable to hold such a hearing closer to the time of license restoration, he is making a policy argument that should be addressed to the legislature, rather than to this court.

RSA 167:6 (2014) (amended 2016); see also Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 637 (2007) (explaining that review of DHHS fair hearings decisions is by petition for certiorari).

In sum, we conclude that the conflicting policy considerations inherent in creating such a change to existing law dictate that, if this change is to be made, it should be done by the legislature.

The appeal procedures under RSA chapter 282-A “as a whole would appear designed to minimize inaccuracies and to assure quality and fairness in adjudication.” Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007) (quotation omitted).

“Matters of public policy are reserved for the legislature, and we therefore leave to it the task of addressing the [respondent’s] concerns.” Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007).

Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 637 (2007) (stating that review of fair hearings decisions issued by the department is by petition for certiorari).

RSA 167:3-j (2014) (concerning minimum duration of impairment for aid to the permanently and totally disabled); Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 634 (2007) (noting that the aid to the permanently and totally disabled program “is one of various public assistance programs administered by” the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services).

We, therefore, leave to them the task of addressing the concerns expressed by the petitioner.

The Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances.

The respondents argue that our decision “create[s] havoc in the public sector labor community by establishing the Superior Court as an appellate body for run of the mill employment related arbitration cases, even for labor agreements that do not invoke RSA 542.” This argument is made to the wrong forum, as matters of public policy are reserved for the legislature.

Although we appreciate the importance of such considerations, “[m]atters of public policy are reserved for the legislature, and we therefore leave to it the task of addressing the [plaintiff’s concerns.” Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007).

To the extent that the plaintiff relies upon public policy to support her construction of RSA 508:14, I, she makes her argument in the wrong forum, as 4 matters of public policy are reserved for the legislature.

The petitioner makes this argument in the wrong forum.

However, the Department makes “[its] argument in the wrong forum.” Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645 (2007).

Such matters of public policy are reserved for the legislature.

“For more than a century, the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 638 (2007) (quotation omitted).

797, 102 L.Ed.2d 788 (1989); Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 645, 939 A.2d 198 (2007) (noting, "[m]atters of public policy are reserved for the legislature").

Petition of Kilton, 156 N.H. 632, 637 *502 (2007); see also Petition of Moore Ctr.