Cited by

“Trial court determinations under RSA 458:16-a, I, are reviewed de novo, while equitable divisions of property pursuant to RSA 458:16-a, II are reviewed for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

In the Matter of Geraghty & Geraghty, 169 N.H. 404, 417 (2016); In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

iate control over his or her share of the marital estate in order to ease the transition of the parties after dissolution,” and of interpreting property settlements “so as to avoid 5 future conflicts between [the] parties.” In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 436 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-17 (2007).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 3 N.H. 425, 436-37 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 436 (2006) (explaining that “a trial court should award a property settlement to be effected immediately where practicable”), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

We have held that, in the context of marital cases, “determining the value of any given asset is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

“Determining the value of any given asset is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

Id.; see also In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007) (“[D]etermining the value of any given asset is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 430 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 437 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007); see also Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 656- 57 (1978) (upholding trial court’s exclusion of purported debt from marital estate where there was evidence upon which trial court could conclude that repayment of debt would represent satisfaction of a moral, not legal, obligation).

“[D]etermining the value of any given asset is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 439 (2006) (explaining that trial court properly relied upon wife’s non-economic contributions as primary homemaker and caretaker for children when fashioning property settlement), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

“We have recognized that a ‘moral’ obligation for repayment cannot properly be characterized as a debt chargeable to the marital estate.” In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 437 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 430 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

In a divorce proceeding, the trial court is given discretion in determining the value of any given asset, In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007), and “the equitable distribution of the marital estate,” Telgener, 148 N.H. at 191 (quotation omitted).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 430 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 430 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

id.; In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 17-18 (2007) (holding that, because the parties had no right to invade the corpus of an irrevocable trust, funds given to the trust were not marital property for purposes of RSA 458:16-a, but that the parties’ right to receive income from the trust was marital property subject to equitable distribution).

RSA 458:16-a, I (“Property shall include all tangible and intangible property and assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both parties, whether title to the property is held in the name of either or both parties.” (emphasis added)); In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 17 (2007) (holding that, because trust corpus “was not an asset belonging to either or both of the parties at the time of their divorce, the trial court did not commit legal error by excluding [it] f

In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

at 450; see In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007) (“[Determining the value of any given asset is left to the sound discretion of the trial court”).

We review de novo a trial court’s determination that a particular asset is marital property as defined by RSA 458:16-a, I (2004); see In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

“[T]he trial court first determines, as a matter of law, what assets are marital property under RSA 458:16-a, I, and thus subject to equitable distribution, and then exercises its discretion to make an equitable distribution of those assets.” In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

Alimony should, therefore, generally be “designed to encourage the recipient to establish an independent source of income.” In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 431 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 15-16 (2007).

In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 436 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007).

See, e.g., In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 283-85 [2006); In the Matter of Harvey & Harvey, 153 N.H. 425, 430 (2006), overruled on other grounds by In the Matter of Chamberlin & Chamberlin, 155 N.H. 13, 16 (2007); In the Matter of Sutton & Sutton, 148 N.H. 676, 679 (2002).