Cited by

Id.; see also State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006) (explaining that vagueness may invalidate a statute for either of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary 6 intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; or (2) it authorizes or even encourages arbitrar

4 In this case, the indictment similarly alleges that the defendant knowingly engaged in a “pattern of sexual assault,” a term that is defined in RSA 632-A:1, I-c as meaning “committing more than one act under RSA 632- A:2 or RSA 632-A:3, or both, upon the same victim over a period of 2 months or more and within a period of 5 years.” RSA 632-A:1, I-c; cf. State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 312-13 (2006) (in assessing sufficiency of indictment alleging that defendant maintained a dwelling house “re

A statute is substantially overbroad if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.

A statute can be impermissibly vague for either one of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; or (2) it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

Although we ordinarily review decisions regarding bail for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, Spaulding, 172 N.H. at 207, the issue of whether the trial court correctly concluded that the defendant’s continued preventive detention does not violate his federal due process rights raises a question of constitutional law, which we review de novo, see State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006) (explaining that we review questions of constitutional law de novo); cf. State v. Willey, 163 N.H. 53

o build a meaningful post-prison life.” In addition, he argues, even “if the definition of lifetime imprisonment is tied to a juvenile’s actuarily- projected death,” the trial court erred by using “life expectancy tables based on the general American population, rather than information focused on the life expectancy of long-term prisoners.” We review questions of constitutional law de novo.

Thus, the plaintiff must show that the ordinance is vague as applied to its use of the property.

The sufficiency of a charge is determined not by inquiring whether the charge could be more certain and comprehensive, but whether it contains the elements of the offense and enough facts to warn the accused of the specific charges against him or her.

The vagueness doctrine, “originally a due process doctrine, applies when the statutory language is unclear, and is concerned with notice to the potential wrongdoer and prevention of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Lambert, 446 F. Supp. at 897; see also State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006) (explaining that vagueness may invalidate a statute for either of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what co

profile information” “fails to ground the application of RSA 651-B:4-a to [the defendant’s] case in a non-vague manner.” A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; or (2) it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

The issue before us is one of constitutional law, which we review de novo.

When a vagueness claim does not involve a fundamental right, a facial attack on the challenged statutory scheme is unwarranted, and the respondent does not argue that the privilege to operate a boat is a fundamental right.

Once a crime has been identified with factual specificity, however, there is no additional requirement that the acts by which a defendant may have committed the offense be identified.

We review questions of constitutional law de novo.

Because the issue before us is one of constitutional law, we review it de novo.

“A party challenging a statute as void for vagueness bears a heavy burden of proof in view of the strong presumption favoring a statute’s constitutionality.” State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006).

We review the trial court’s construction of constitutional provisions de novo as “the final arbiter of State constitutional disputes.” Below II, 151 N.H. at 139; see also State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006).

We review constitutional issues de novo.

“A party challenging a statute as void for vagueness bears a heavy burden of proof in view of the strong presumption of a statute’s constitutionality.” State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006).

[1] Because the issue before us is one of constitutional law, we review it de novo.

We take the facts as presented in the interlocutory transfer statement.

Our settled rule is to first address the defendant’s claims under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 (1983), and cite federal opinions for guidance only.

To trigger a state constitutional analysis, an appellant must: (1) raise the state constitutional issue in the trial court; and (2) specifically invoke a State constitutional provision in his or her brief.

We address this argument under the Federal Constitution only as the plaintiffs have failed to cite any provision under the State Constitution.

“A party challenging a statute as void for vagueness bears a heavy burden of proof in view of the strong presumption favoring a statute’s constitutionality.” State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006).

“A party challenging a statute as void for vagueness bears a heavy burden of proof in view of the strong presumption favoring a statute’s constitutionality.” State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307 (2006).

First, we note that where a defendant’s vagueness claim does not involve a fundamental right, a facial attack on the challenged statutory scheme is unwarranted.