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“A defendant does not have an unqualified due process right to compel depositions in a criminal case.” State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 236 (2005).

The court stated that if the mother “is willing to be interviewed by the defendant’s investigator, as the State suggests is a possibility, the parties should proceed on an informal basis.” A defendant does not have an unqualified due process right to compel depositions in a criminal case.

State v. Schonarth, 152 N.H. 560, 564 (2005) (assuming, without deciding, that RSA 517:13, II(a) and (b) must be read separately for purposes of addressing defendant’s argument); State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 236 (2005) (citing the statutory factors in RSA 517:13, II(b) without addressing whether they apply to RSA 517:13, II(a) and (b)); Howe, 145 N.H. at 44 (generally addressing necessity under RSA 517:13).

Porter v. City of Manchester, 155 N.H. 149, 157 (2007) (declining to review a party’s argument where it failed to “undertake a collateral estoppel analysis, or to develop its legal argument”); see also State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 239-40 (2005) (“[A] mere laundry list of complaints, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.”).

State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 242 (2005) (stating post-offense flight is probative of defendant’s consciousness of guilt).

But, even assuming that he does not make this concession, we conclude that any such argument is insufficiently developed for our review.

State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 239-40 (2005) (noting that an undeveloped legal argument “is insufficient to warrant judicial review”).

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding that the relevant issues were not complex, the defendant could discover the information by “other means,” and the depositions were not “necessary.” See RSA 517:13, II (2007); State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233 (2005).

Once the trial court has determined that the expert’s methodology is reliable, “[t]he appropriate method of testing the basis of an expert’s opinion is by cross-examination of the expert.” State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 244-45 (2005) (quotation omitted).

The practice in New Hampshire has been that jury voir dire is conducted solely by the trial judge, except in capital and first-degree murder cases.

The State contended that Juror 13 had been inattentive and sleeping “through a substantial portion of the State’s case-in-chief,” and argued, citing State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 239-40 (2005), that non-randomly selecting Juror 13 to serve as an alternate would be an appropriate exercise of discretion.

New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 703 provides that facts or data upon which an expert bases his opinion need not be admissible if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, or provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision upon something other than the established propositions in the case.

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court.

In the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.

State v. Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 239 (2005); see also State v. Chick, 141 N.H. 503, 504 (1996) (passing reference to a constitutional principle is not a substitute for a valid constitutional argument and is therefore waived).