State of New Hampshire v. Kenneth Mofford

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0314, State of New Hampshire v. Kenneth
Mofford, the court on January 13, 2016, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Kenneth Mofford, appeals his conviction, following a bench
trial in Circuit Court (DeVries, J.), on a charge of simple assault. See RSA 631:2-
a, I(a) (2007). He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did not act in self-defense. See RSA
627:4, I (2007); State v. Richard, 160 N.H. 780, 788 (2010) (holding that, once
some evidence of self-defense is admitted, conduct negating defense becomes
element of charged offense that State must prove beyond reasonable doubt).

To prevail in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant
bears the burden of establishing that no rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Germain, 165 N.H. 350, 354-55 (2013). We examine
each evidentiary item in the context of all the evidence, not in isolation. Id. at
355. The trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts proved and also
inferences from facts found as a result of other inferences, provided they can be
reasonably drawn therefrom. Id.

The defendant argues that “[t]here was no credible evidence that the
assault occurred in the manner described by the alleged victim.” The credibility
of witnesses is a factual determination within the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Gordon, 141 N.H. 703, 705 (1997). The trier of fact is in the best
position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence and is not
compelled to believe even uncontroverted evidence. State v. Dodds, 159 N.H.
239, 247 (2009). Unless no reasonable person could have come to the same
conclusion, we defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations. Gordon, 141
N.H. at 706.

In this case, the victim’s testimony supported the trial court’s finding that
the defendant did not act in self-defense. The defendant argues that the State
did not challenge the credibility of his third-party eye-witness, Jacob Bouchard.
We disagree. The State elicited Bouchard’s testimony that he did not make a
statement to the police exculpating the defendant until more than two months
after the event. Furthermore, the victim testified that, immediately after striking
him, the defendant instructed Bouchard “you seen him punch me first,” and
both Bouchard and the victim testified that, after the altercation, the defendant
left the scene without waiting for the check for which he had come. See State v.
Fernandez, 152 N.H. 233, 242 (2005) (stating post-offense flight is probative of
defendant’s consciousness of guilt). We conclude that a reasonable person could
have come to the same conclusion as the trial court regarding the witnesses’
credibility. See Dodds, 159 N.H. at 247.

The defendant argues that the following facts “cast doubt on the strength
and credibility of the case”: (1) he was charged with only a Class B
misdemeanor; (2) his sentence was suspended upon the condition that he write
the victim, who is his uncle, a “meaningful letter of apology”; and (3) the State
failed to interview Bouchard. Assuming without deciding that this argument was
preserved and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant did not strike the victim in self-defense. See Germain,
165 N.H. at 354-55 (2013).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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