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A defendant’s recklessness does not depend on the actual harm that occurred, nor on whether the defendant anticipated the precise risk that resulted.

However, the jury could have disregarded the defendant’s explanation for her conduct if they questioned her credibility.

at 455 (finding evidence sufficient to support DUI conviction when, after officer stopped defendant for crossing double yellow line, defendant exhibited signs of impairment, failed field sobriety tests, and admitted to having consumed alcohol); State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 712 (2003) (finding sufficient evidence of intoxication based upon officers’ testimony that defendant smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, had blood shot eyes, swayed while standing, and performed poorly on field sobriety t

However, “[i]t does not matter how overlapping, reciprocal, or similar the evidence used to sustain the indictments was if a difference in evidence is actually required to prove the crime charged.” State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 717 (2003); see also MacLeod, 141 N.H. at 429-30 (“Our conclusion is not affected by the defendant’s claim that the State might utilize overlapping or reciprocal evidence to establish both offenses.

which the actor commits with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury”); cf. State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 715 (2003) (upholding jury’s finding that the defendant’s truck, in the manner in which it was used, was known to be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury).

her registration); Wiggin, 151 N.H. at 309 (holding that evidence of intoxication was sufficient where officer noticed an odor of alcohol when he approached the defendant, observed the defendant’s flushed face and bloodshot, glassy eyes, the defendant admitted to having consumed alcohol, the defendant failed five field sobriety tests, and refused to submit to a blood alcohol test); State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 712 (2003) (determining that evidence of intoxication was sufficient where there was e

A. “Reckless” Mens Rea To prove that the defendant acted with a “reckless” mens rea, the State had to show that he was aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial, unjustifiable risk that serious bodily injury would result from his conduct.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, 4 that the defendant was “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” for purposes of RSA 265-A:2, I. See State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 712 (2003) (finding that evidence that defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech and blood shot eyes, swayed, performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and refused to take a blood alcohol test was sufficien

Regardless of whether the evidence is solely circumstantial or involves both direct and circumstantial evidence, we still consider it in the light most favorable to the State, and we examine each evidentiary item in the context of all of the evidence, not in isolation.

Regardless of whether the evidence is solely circumstantial or involves both direct and circumstantial evidence, we still consider it in the light most favorable to the State, and we examine each evidentiary item in the context of all of the evidence, not in isolation.

Dalianis, C.J., and Lynn, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ., concurred; Hicks, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his dissent in State of New Hampshire v. Meghan Sage, and would affirm the trial court’s order as a correct application of State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 708-11 (2003).

The defendant also challenged the State's intent to use her prior OUI conviction from Maine for sentence enhancement purposes, see RSA 265-A:2, I,:18, IV, asserting that Maine's OUI offense was not "reasonably equivalent" to New Hampshire's DUI offense under the elements-based approach to the determination established by this court in State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 710, 827 A.2d 1001 (2003).

State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 713 (2003); RSA 626:2, II(c) (2016).

Although, in her testimony, the defendant denied knowing that Doane sold heroin, the jury could have disregarded her explanation if it questioned her credibility.

Thus, “[t]o prove the defendant acted in a reckless manner, the State had to show that the defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded a substantial, unjustifiable risk that serious bodily injury would result from his conduct.” State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 713 (2003).

pon as defined in RSA 625:11, V (2007) is “any firearm, knife or other substance or thing which, in the manner it is used, intended to be used, or threatened to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” Whether a motor vehicle driven in a reckless manner is a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the jury to decide based upon the totality of the circumstances.

es “deadly weapon” as “any firearm, knife or other substance or thing which, in the manner it is used, intended to be used, or threatened to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” We have said that the critical phrase is whether “the manner [in which an object] is used, intended to be used, or threatened to be used” can produce death or serious bodily injury.

RSA 626:2, II(c) (2007); see State v. Botelho, 165 N.H. ___, ___ (decided December 24, 2013); see also State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 713 (2003) (“To prove the defendant acted in a reckless manner, the State had to show that the defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded a substantial, unjustifiable risk that serious bodily injury would result from his conduct.”).

For the purpose of double jeopardy analysis, two charged offenses cannot be regarded as the same offense if they do not arise out of the “same act or transaction.” See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); State v. Matey, 153 N.H. 263, 270 (2006); see also State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 717 (2003).

Cf State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 716 (2003) (for double jeopardy purposes, “[t]wo offenses will be considered the same unless each requires proof of an element that the other does not” (quotation omitted)).

See, e.g., State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 712 (2003) (“To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant must prove that no rational fact finder at trial, viewing all of the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”).

We again emphasize that the specific manner of use or intended use and.the circumstances surrounding that use or intended use determine whether an object is a deadly weapon under RSA 625:11, V. Pratte, 158 N.H. at 49; State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 714-15 (2003) (explaining that a reasonable jury could determine that a truck could be a deadly weapon where an intoxicated driver hit a police officer and drove into oncoming traffic).

is the sufficiency of the evidence and we review the entire trial record to make that determination.” State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 711-12 (2003).

Doe argues that our analysis in State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 708-10, 827 A.2d 1001 (2003), requires a different result in this case.

Doe argues that our analysis in State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 708-10 (2003), requires a different result in this case.

State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 712 (2003) (holding that evidence of intoxication was sufficient where *452 defendant admitted having consumed three beers, smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, blood shot eyes, swayed while standing, and performed poorly on field sobriety tests).

State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 714-15 (2003); see also State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 591 (1983) (interpreting State and Federal Constitutions as guaranteeing a jury determination on all factual elements of the crime charged).

The jury was free to accept or reject any portion of the victim’s testimony in its deliberations.

Because the defendant chose to present a case after unsuccessfully moving to dismiss, the issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence and we review the entire trial record to make that determination.

‘When the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we examine the nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question.” State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 709 (2003).

“Because the defendant chose to present a case after unsuccessfully moving to dismiss, however, the issue on appeal as to both motions is the sufficiency of the evidence and we review the entire trial record to make that determination.” State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 711-12 (2003).

As we have previously stated, it is the manner in which the “other substance or thing” is used, and the circumstances surrounding its use, that makes it a deadly weapon under RSA 625:11, V. See State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 714 (2003).

When reviewing two separate indictments, “[i]t does not matter how overlapping, reciprocal, or similar the evidence used to sustain the indictments was if a difference in evidence is actually required to prove the crime charged.” State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 717 (2003); see State v. McKean, 147 N.H. 198, 201-02 (2001) (no double jeopardy violation where defendant was convicted of kidnapping and criminal threatening in the same transaction despite similar elements and factual allegations in the c

In doing so, we must first look to the plain language of the statute to determine legislative intent.

Next, we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant “recklessly damage[d] property of another.” RSA 634:2, I. To determine whether the evidence was sufficient in this case, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.

Our task is to construe Criminal Code provisions according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice.

State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 712 (2003); State v. Chapman, 149 N.H. 753, 758 (2003).