State of New Hampshire v. Jeffrey Guyette

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2014-0327, State of New Hampshire v. Jeffrey
Guyette, the court on June 19, 2015, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. Following
a jury trial in Superior Court (Delker, J.), the defendant was convicted on one
count of felony-level reckless conduct with a deadly weapon, RSA 631:3, I, II
(2007). On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to prove that he: (1) acted recklessly; and (2) “used” a firearm as a
deadly weapon. We affirm.

The jury could have found the following facts. On December 11, 2012,
Hampton Falls Police Officer Lister went to the defendant’s home to serve a
restraining order on the defendant and his wife. The restraining order, issued
in Massachusetts, related to a dispute between the defendant’s wife and her
family. The order required the defendant to relinquish all firearms and
ammunition in his possession.

Upon arriving at the defendant’s residence, Lister knocked on the front
door. The defendant answered, and the two had a conversation in the
breezeway of the residence. As Lister explained the purpose of his visit, he
described the defendant as calm, relaxed, and attentive. After Lister told the
defendant that he would require the defendant to hand over his firearms and
ammunition, the defendant’s “mood changed a little bit.” The defendant said:
“Oh, no. That’s going to be a problem.” The defendant stated that Lister was
violating the defendant’s “civil rights,” and that he did not need to comply with
an order from another state. Lister then requested that Hampton Falls Police
Chief Dirsa come to the defendant’s residence, because Dirsa knew the
defendant.

Once Dirsa arrived, he reiterated what Lister had told the defendant.
However, the defendant continued to resist complying with the order. Shortly
thereafter, the defendant’s wife arrived home and invited the officers inside.
After about thirty minutes of discussion, the defendant agreed to give the
officers his firearms. The defendant told them that the firearms were in the
basement. Lister informed the defendant that he was going to go to the
basement with the defendant, to which the defendant replied, “No, you won’t.”
Dirsa explained to the defendant that Lister must accompany him “because I
don’t want you to go downstairs and bring a gun back up and shoot me.” In
response, the defendant “smirk[ed],” but said nothing.

The defendant went down into the basement, followed by Lister and
Dirsa. Once downstairs, the defendant walked over to three storage containers
stacked on top of one another. As the defendant removed the lid of one
container, Lister saw several knives and three handgun cases.

The defendant reached for one of the cases. Lister then instructed the
defendant not to touch the case. Both the defendant and Lister placed their
hands on the case, and the defendant opened it. As the defendant reached into
the case, Lister said, “[D]on’t touch the gun.” The defendant picked up the
firearm. Several times, Lister told the defendant to “put the gun down,” but the
defendant did not comply. A struggle ensued, with both Lister and Dirsa
“grabbing” the defendant. The defendant eventually released the firearm, and
was handcuffed. It was later determined that the firearm was loaded and did
not have a safety mechanism.

The defendant was charged with one count of reckless conduct with a
deadly weapon and one count of criminal threatening. At the close of the
State’s case, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the evidence
presented was insufficient to find him guilty of either charge. The trial court
denied the motion. The jury acquitted the defendant of criminal threatening
but found him guilty of reckless conduct with a deadly weapon. This appeal
followed.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
find him guilty of felony-level reckless conduct with a deadly weapon.
Specifically, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
by the jury either that he acted recklessly or that he “use[d]” a deadly weapon
as defined in RSA 625:11, V (2007). The State counters that the officers’
testimony was sufficient to prove reckless conduct with a deadly weapon.

“To prevail upon his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
defendant must demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the
evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the
State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Belleville, 166 N.H. 58, 61 (2014). “Because persons rarely explain to others the inner
workings of their minds or mental processes, a culpable mental state must, in
most cases, be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 62 (quotation and
brackets omitted). “When the evidence as to one or more of the elements of the
charged offense is solely circumstantial, it must exclude all reasonable
conclusions except guilt.” Id. “Under this standard, however, we still consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and examine each
evidentiary item in context, not in isolation.” Id. Further, “[w]e review the
entire trial record because, even though the defendant is not required to

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present a case, if [he] chooses to do so, [he] takes the chance that evidence
presented in [his] case may assist in proving the State’s case.” State v. Dion, 164 N.H. 544, 548 (2013).

We first turn to the defendant’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient for the jury to find that he acted recklessly. Under RSA 631:3, I,
“[a] person is guilty of reckless conduct if he recklessly engages in conduct
which places or may place another in danger of serious bodily injury.”

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the circumstances known to him, its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the situation.

RSA 626:2, II(c) (2007). Thus, “[t]o prove the defendant acted in a reckless
manner, the State had to show that the defendant was aware of but
consciously disregarded a substantial, unjustifiable risk that serious bodily
injury would result from his conduct.” State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 713 (2003).
“In addition, the State had to show that the defendant’s disregard for the risk
of injury to another was a gross deviation from the regard that would be given
by a law-abiding citizen.” Id. Whether a defendant acted recklessly “does not
“depend upon whether the defendant anticipated the precise risk or injury that
resulted.” Id.

Here, the defendant did not comply with Lister’s instructions not to
touch the gun case — in fact, the defendant opened the case. Lister then
commanded the defendant not to touch the weapon, but the defendant picked
up the firearm by its grip. Lister testified that he witnessed the defendant’s
finger on the trigger and that the defendant’s “hand came roughly in [the]
fashion like he was going to shoot [the gun].” The defendant then “raised his
hands up . . . towards [Lister’s] face.” Dirsa testified that the defendant raised
the firearm “close to shoulder level.” Both officers “grabb[ed]” the defendant,
yet the defendant still did not surrender the weapon. The officers struggled
with the defendant, and had to shake his arm several times before he finally let
go of the weapon.

Based upon this evidence, the jury could have found that the defendant’s
actions created “a substantial, unjustifiable risk that serious bodily injury
would result from his conduct.” Id. A rational jury could reasonably have
concluded that picking up a loaded firearm, which did not have a safety
mechanism, and raising it toward two police officers after being instructed not
to touch the weapon, created a substantial, unjustifiable risk that the

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defendant would shoot the officers or that serious bodily injury would
otherwise result from his conduct.

Additionally, the jury could have found that, when the defendant ignored
Lister’s command not to touch the gun case or the firearm and, instead, raised
the firearm toward the officers, he was “aware of but consciously disregarded”
this risk. Id. The defendant testified that he heard Dirsa’s comment that Dirsa
was concerned that the defendant would shoot him. The defendant also
testified that he had taken a firearm safety course and that he “presum[es] all
firearms are loaded.” The defendant further acknowledged that the “best
possible thing to do” from a safety standpoint would have been not to touch the
firearm at all. Furthermore, of the three firearms that were in the storage
container, only the firearm that the defendant picked up was loaded. Although
the defendant testified that he was confused as to the manner in which the
officers wanted him to relinquish the firearms, and that he did not hear Lister’s
commands, the jury “could have disregarded any explanation given for his
conduct if they questioned the defendant’s credibility.” Id.

The jury could have also found that a law-abiding citizen would not have
raised a loaded firearm in the direction of the officers, and that the defendant’s
conduct was a “gross deviation from the regard that would be given by a law-
abiding citizen.” Id. A jury could have concluded that instead of raising the
loaded firearm in the direction of the officers, a law-abiding person would have
awaited instructions from the officers on how best to proceed. Accordingly, the
defendant has failed to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact could have
found that he acted recklessly.

The defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence that he
“used” a deadly weapon. “Reckless conduct is a class B felony if the person
uses a deadly weapon as defined in RSA 625:11, V.” RSA 631:3, II. RSA
625:11, V defines “[d]eadly weapon” as “any firearm, knife, or other substance
or thing which, in the manner it is used, intended to be used, or threatened to
be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”
RSA 625:11, V. Whether “the defendant used a firearm in such a manner that
it constituted a deadly weapon . . . is a question of fact for the jury based upon
the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Kousounadis, 159 N.H. 413, 425
(2009) (citation omitted).

Here, the defendant argues that “[t]here is no indication in the evidence
of any other possible ‘use’ other than complying with the police request for
surrender of the firearm.” We disagree. As recounted above, the defendant
picked up a loaded firearm by its grip, with his finger on the trigger. He then
raised the firearm toward Lister’s face despite being repeatedly instructed by
the officer to put the firearm down. Based upon this evidence, a rational trier
of fact could have concluded that the defendant “intended” or “threatened” to

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use the firearm in a manner “capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury.” RSA 625:11, V.

Finally, the defendant argues that, “[w]hen the jury acquitted [the
defendant] of Criminal Threatening, the jury itself declared that there was not
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was used to threaten the
police.” We disagree. The jury may well have determined that, although the
defendant did not have the purposeful mental state required for criminal
threatening, he nonetheless acted recklessly. See RSA 631:4, I(a) (2007). If the
jury so concluded, the jury could have properly convicted the defendant of
reckless conduct with a deadly weapon, and, at the same time, could have
acquitted the defendant of criminal threatening.

Affirmed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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