Cited by

Bourassa, 157 N.H. at 358; see Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003).

We will uphold the trial court’s findings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous, Brooks v. Allen, 168 N.H. 707, 711 (2016), deferring to the trial court on issues such as resolving conflicts in the testimony, assessing the credibility of the witnesses, and determining the weight to be given to the evidence presented at trial, Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003).

We will affirm the trial court’s findings if a reasonable person could have made such findings based upon the evidence presented.

We conclude that the trial court’s findings regarding the wife’s expenses could reasonably have been made based upon the evidence presented.

We will affirm the trial court’s findings if a reasonable person could have made such findings based upon the evidence presented.

Although the evidence before the trial court was conflicting, we defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence.

2 We will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are erroneous as a matter of law.

We will affirm the trial court’s findings if a reasonable person could have made such findings based upon the evidence presented.

We will affirm the trial court’s findings if a reasonable person could have made such findings based upon the evidence presented.

Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003) (explaining that “we defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight 4 to be given evidence”).

We will affirm the trial court’s findings if a reasonable person could have made them based upon the evidence presented.

We will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack support in the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law.

We will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they are unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law, deferring to the trial court on matters such as resolving conflicts in the testimony, evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, and determining the weight to be given the evidence.

Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003); see Webb v. Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 150 (1967) (stating nuisance is question of fact).

Collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action, or a person or entity in privity with that party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action.

We will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they are unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law, deferring to the trial court on matters such as resolving conflicts in the testimony, evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, and determining the weight to be given the evidence.

We will affirm the trial court’s findings if a reasonable person could have made such findings based upon the evidence presented.

Our standard of review is not whether we would rule differently than the trial court, but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence.

We ordinarily uphold a trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous.

We will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous.

“The relationship between party and non-party implied by a finding of privity in the estoppel context has been described as one of virtual representation, and substantial identity.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 779 (2003) (quotation omitted).

“It is within the province of the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented, including that of the expert witnesses.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003).

lthough Miller testified that he believed that the right to purchase the race track belonged to Johnston and that the escrowed deposit was merely a “loan” to Johnston, the trial court “d[id] not credit any of this testimony.” We defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in testimony, assessing the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight of the evidence.

We defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in testimony, assessing the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight of the evidence.

Although we have stated that res judicata and collateral estoppel may preclude the relitigation of issues decided in prior administrative decisions, see Tyler v. *655 Hannaford Bros., 161 N.H. 242, 246 (2010); Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 777-78 (2003), these doctrines cannot operate in RSA 72:12-a determinations because the process used has a uniquely non-adjudicative character.

“A private nuisance exists *781 when an activity substantially and unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of another’s property.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003) (quotation omitted).

collateral estoppel [has] been established to avoid repetitive litigation so that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an end.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 777 (2003) (quotation omitted).

t[old] them not to unlock the tanks.” It was within the discretion of the trial court to credit the plaintiffs testimony over that of the defendant, as it did here.

The probate court’s decision on this issue had collateral estoppel and/or res judicata effect.

Specifically, he asserts that privity did not exist because his interests in their litigation “were not in fact represented and protected.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 779 (2003).

When engaging in this inquiry, we are guided by the rule that “[t]he trier of fact is in the best position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence and is not compelled to believe even uncontroverted evidence.” Restaurant Operators, Inc. v. Jenney, 128 N.H. 708, 711 (1986); see also Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003) (explaining that the trial court is in the best position to “resolv[e] conflicts in the testimony, measur[e] the credibility of witnesses, and determin[e] t

west Mortgage, Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 143 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining how "allocations of price by interested parties to elements of a package [deal] may readily be manipulated to defeat contractual rights to substantially similar price terms"); Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 651 P.2d 928, 934 (1982), and we are ill-suited to make such factual findings in the first instance, see Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780, 829 A.2d 1059 (2003) (explaining that the trial court is in the best position to "

When engaging in this inquiry, we are guided by the rule that “[t]he trier of fact is in the best position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence and is not compelled to believe even uncontroverted evidence.” Restaurant Operators, Inc. v. Jenney, 128 N.H. 708, 711 (1986); see also Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003) (explaining that the trial court is in the best position to “resolv[e] conflicts in the testimony, measur[e] the credibility of witnesses, and determin[e] t

Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 143 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining how “allocations of price by interested parties to elements of a package [deal] may readily be manipulated to defeat contractual rights to substantially similar price terms”); Gyurkey v. Babler, 651 P.2d 928, 934 (Idaho 1982), and we are ill-suited to make such factual findings in the first instance, see, e.g., Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003) (explaining how the trial court is in the best position to “resolv[e] confl

It *718 was within, the trial court’s discretion to resolve conflicts in the testimony, measure the credibility of witnesses, and determine the weight to be given evidence.

Ct. 2003), “showed cut through litigation is allowable on particular facts,” and thus “the Court had ample reason to conclude that direct dealing was a credible threat.” We will uphold the superior court’s findings and rulings unless they lack evidential support or are legally erroneous.

Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003) (court defers to trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in testimony, measuring credibility of witnesses, and determining weight to be given evidence).

B. Merits of Defendant’s Collateral Estoppel Arguments “Spurred by considerations of judicial economy and a policy of certainty and finality in our legal system, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have been established to avoid repetitive litigation so that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an end.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 777 (2003) (quotation omitted).

The respondent contends that it is “arguable that the Probate Court simply ignored [his testimony] that [he] had the potential to make sufficiently informed health care decisions.” It is, however, “within *498 the province of the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003).

We will uphold the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they lack evidential support or are legally erroneous.

Thus, we defer to the trial court’s resolution of conflicts in the testimony, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given evidence.

Thus, we defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence.

The propriety of affording equitable relief rests in the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised according to the circumstances and exigencies of the case.