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“Our case law, however, does not foreclose the possibility of an easement benefiting a non-dominant tenement.” Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 330 (2002).

Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002).

Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002).

“The rule of reason applies at two points in the analysis of easements.” Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002).

“Reasonableness is a question of fact that is determined by considering the surrounding circumstances, such as location and the use of the parties’ properties, and the advantages and disadvantages to each party.” Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 332 (2002); see Sakansky, 86 N.H. at 339.

Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002).

RSA 491:8-a, II (2010); see Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 332 (2002); Lussier v. N.E.

at 702; Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002).

We use the rule of reason “to interpret and give reasonable meaning to general or unclear terms in the deed language granting an easement,” but we also use it, “irrespective of the deed language,” to “determine whether a particular use of the easement would be unreasonably burdensome.” Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002); see Thurston Enterprises, Inc. v. Baldi, 128 N.H. 760, 766 (1986) (noting that “an easement created by deed is always limited to a reasonable use”).

Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002).

We have departed from this general rule in two cases: Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 330-31 (2002), and Soukup v. Brooks, 159 N.H. 9, 19 (2009).

Thus, they contend that ruling in favor of the Brookses would “expand[] the scope of the easement beyond what Dibner expressly intended, to make the Brooks lot a defacto dominant estate too[].” “Our case law, however, does not foreclose the possibility of an easement benefiting a non-dominant tenement.” Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 330 (2002).

Thus, “[w]hen the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, we need not consider extrinsic evidence.” Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002).

Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 332 (2002).

Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 329 (2002).