Robert C. Michele & a. v. Joseph Bremner & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2014-0793, Robert C. Michele & a. v. Joseph
Bremner & a., the court on November 9, 2015, issued the
following order:

The defendants’ motion for special leave to submit supplemental
memorandum is denied. The plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendants’
October 8, 2015 letter to the court is moot.

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties and the
record submitted on appeal, the court concludes that a formal written opinion
is unnecessary in the case. The defendants, Joseph Bremner and Linda
Bremner, appeal one of the rulings of the Superior Court (Kissinger, J.)
regarding their easement over the property of the plaintiffs, Robert C. Michele
and Katherine L. Michele, as Trustees of the Robert C. Michele Revocable
Trust. We affirm.

The defendants’ deeded easement over the plaintiffs’ property allows
them use of a specified “parcel of shore frontage for whatever purposes they
may desire.” In 2006, the defendants removed trees from the easement area
without prior consent of the plaintiffs. In 2008, the defendants “installed a
dock and a float in the water adjacent to the easement area.” In addition, they
have “left personal property including a garden trellis in the easement area.” In
2013, the plaintiffs filed a verified petition for declaratory judgment and
permanent injunctive relief seeking “a judgment declaring the [defendants’]
activity on [the] easement to be inconsistent with the [defendants’] duty to
make reasonable use of the easement area and that the [defendants] ha[d]
unreasonably and unlawfully expanded the scope of the easement.” The
plaintiffs also sought “an injunction against such unreasonable use and/or
expansion.” The defendants filed a counterclaim requesting “a judgment
declaring that their current use of the Easement Area [was] reasonable and
consistent with the Easement” and declaring that they “may use the Easement
Area exclusively and for whatever purposes they may desire, as allowed by
law.”

Following a view of the properties and a subsequent bench trial, the trial
court ruled: (1) that the defendants’ “removal of the trees was a reasonable use
of the easement area”; (2) that the defendants’ “installation of the dock and the
float, as well as storing boats on the dock, [was] reasonable under the
easement”; but (3) that it is “unreasonable for the [defendants] to install
personal property such as a garden trellis or a bench in the easement area.”
The trial court, therefore, ordered the defendants “to remove such personal
property from the easement area.” It also ordered that the defendants “may not
place such items in the easement area in the future.”

On appeal, the defendants challenge the trial court’s ruling regarding
their personal property in the easement area. They argue that: (1) the trial
court misapplied the legal standard for reasonable use of an easement; and (2)
the evidence presented at trial established that their use of the easement area
is reasonable.

Under an express grant of easement, a grantee takes by implication
whatever rights are reasonably necessary to enable it to enjoy the easement
beneficially. Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694, 701 (2004). This includes
the right to make improvements that are reasonably necessary to enjoy the
easement. Id. Further, easement use must conform to the rule of reason. See
id. at 702; Heartz v. City of Concord, 148 N.H. 325, 331 (2002). Under this
rule, the parties involved must act reasonably under the terms of the easement
to prevent interference with the use and enjoyment of each other’s property.
Arcidi, 150 N.H. at 702. Reasonableness is a question of fact that is
determined by considering the surrounding circumstances, such as location
and the use of the parties’ properties, and the advantages and disadvantages to
each party. Id. We will not overturn the trial court’s factual findings, including
those based upon a view of the subject property, when they are supported by
the evidence. Id. As to the defendants’ argument that the trial court
misapplied the reasonable use standard, the interpretation of the trial court’s
order is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Choquette v. Roy, 167
N.H. 507, 513 (2015).

As the appealing parties, the defendants have the burden of
demonstrating reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014).
Based upon our review of the trial court’s order, the defendants’ challenges to
it, the record submitted on appeal, and the relevant law, we conclude that the
defendants have not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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