Cited by

In the Matter of Jones and Jones, 146 N.H. 119, 121 (2001); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

The parties agree that we review the trial court’s decision on a petition brought under RSA 651-B:6, V under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.

State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

“When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

This standard of review requires a review of the record to determine solely whether it establishes a sufficient objective basis to sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgments, and we will not overturn the trial court’s rulings unless the plaintiffs demonstrate that such rulings were clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of their case.

Wright v. Clark Equipment Co., 125 N.H. 299, 303 (1984); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

ides that “[a]ny motion which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue shall be raised before trial, but may, in the discretion of the Court, be heard during trial.” To show that the trial court’s decision was not a sustainable exercise of discretion, the tenants must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of their case.

d, at 135 (2003) (explaining that whether to remove a trustee "is largely left to the discretion of the trial court, but is subject to review for abuse of discretion"); see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296, 787 A.2d 175 (2001) (explaining our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard); Shelton, 164 N.H. at 505, 62 A.3d 741 (applying unsustainable exercise of discretion standard to review trial court's removal of a trustee because no party argued that a different standard of review ap

State v. Dukette, 127 N.H. 540, 543-44 (1986) (reviewing trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s request to allow counsel to withdraw from the case under abuse of discretion standard); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining that we now refer to abuse of discretion standard as unsustainable exercise of discretion standard); see also Panzardi-Alvarez, 879 F.2d at 980-81 (reviewing denial of application for pro hac vice admission under unsustainable exercise of discretion standar

See, e.g., Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 176 (1997); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Under this standard, we review the record to determine whether it provides an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgment.

When we determine whether a ruling made is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgment.

id.; State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

The defendant argues that, without specific findings, “it is impossible to determine whether the trial court considered facts and/or evidence that it should not have.” However, when we determine whether a ruling is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

Digital Equipment Corp. v. Int’l Digital Systems Corp., 130 N.H. 362, 365 (1988); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

Assocs., 145 N.H. 397, 399 (2000) (discussing the standard for reviewing the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict); see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

In applying our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard of review, we determine only “whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

Miller & Todd, 161 N.H. at 630; Smith v. Shepard, 144 N.H. 262, 264 (1999); see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

To show that the trial court’s decision is not sustainable, the defendant must demonstrate that its ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

To show that the trial court’s decision is not sustainable, the defendant must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

To show that the trial court’s decision is unsustainable, the defendant must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

In applying our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard of review, we determine only “whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

To show that the trial court’s exercise of discretion was unsustainable, the defendant must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

The “[f]ailure to exercise discretion constitutes an [unsustainable exercise] of discretion.” DeButts v. LaRoche, 142 N.H. 845, 847 (1998); see State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining “unsustainable exercise of discretion”).

In applying our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s decision to extinguish Bellevue’s easement, we determine “whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard of review).

Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Assoc., 142 N.H. 848, 851 (1998) (noting that we review trial court’s “decision not to hold a hearing for an abuse of discretion”); see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining that we refer to abuse of discretion standard as the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

In doing so, we determine “whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

In doing so, we determine “whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Under this standard, the defendants must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of their case.

e grounds that it was an “untimely filed Motion for Reconsideration.” We review the trial court’s decision under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard, see Lutkus v. Lutkus, 141 N.H. 552, 555 (1997) (addressing motion to strike default judgment), and will affirm if the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the court’s discretionary judgment, see State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 422 (1999); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

State v. Gilbert, 121 N.H. 305, 309-11 (1981); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

To show that the trial court’s decision is not sustainable, the petitioner must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.

The Town argues that the trial court made a factual ruling in favor of the Town regarding the circumstances of the defendant’s absence, supported by an “objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

In re Jesse F., 143 N.H. 192, 196-97 (1998); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Our role is not to review the alimony award de novo, but to determine only whether there is an objective basis “sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Jesse F., 143 N.H. at 193; see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

“When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

“When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

We review a trial court’s sentencing decision for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, State v. LeCouffe, 152 N.H. 148, 153 (2005), which means that we review the record to determine whether it contains an objective basis to sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgment, State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

In the Matter of Jones and Jones, 146 N.H. 119, 121 (2001); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Neumann v. Village of Winnipesaukee Timeshare Owners’ Assoc., 147 N.H. 111, 115 (2001) (noting that “[w]e review the trial court’s grant of equitable relief for an abuse of discretion”); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard); cf., e.g., Singer by Cohen v. Jones, 496 N.W.2d 156, 157 (Wis.

When we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, we are deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judg *632 ment made.

When we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, we are deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.

“When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).