In the Matter of Nadine M. Goulet and Richard E. Goulet, Jr.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0405, In the Matter of Nadine M. Goulet
and Richard E. Goulet, Jr., the court on January 13, 2016,
issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The appellant, Richard Goulet, Jr. (father), appeals an order of the Circuit
Court (Lemire, J.) denying his post-divorce motion to strike arrearage in his
divorce from Nadine Mateychuk f/k/a Nadine Goulet (mother). He contends that
the trial court erred by denying his motion on the grounds that it was an
“untimely filed Motion for Reconsideration.” We review the trial court’s decision
under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard, see Lutkus v. Lutkus, 141 N.H. 552, 555 (1997) (addressing motion to strike default judgment), and will
affirm if the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the court’s
discretionary judgment, see State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

The husband does not challenge the trial court’s characterization of his
motion to strike as an untimely motion to reconsider the trial court’s prior 2014
order awarding the mother “additional arrearages,” which order the husband
concedes he failed to timely appeal. See Fam. Div. R. 1.31(A) (providing that,
when party fails to file timely notice of appeal, “all appeals shall be deemed
waived and final judgment shall be entered”). Instead, he argues that his failure
to timely seek reconsideration of that order “should not necessarily be
dispositive.” The only explanation he offers for his failure to appeal is that he
was self-represented. Self-represented litigants, however, are bound by the same
procedural rules that govern parties represented by counsel. In the Matter of
Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006).

The husband argues that public policy requires “some redress for orders
entered in conflict with statute and case law, especially in cases where the
particular order is a continuing one.” That redress is an appeal. The husband
argues that the trial court had the discretion to: (1) waive any of its rules “[a]s
good cause appears and as justice may require,” Fam. Div. R. 1.2; and (2) “use its
authority to correct the error of its earlier decision.” However, even though the
trial court’s arrearage order may well have been erroneous, see RSA 458-C:7, II
(2004); RSA 461-A:14, VIII (2004), because the husband failed to appeal the 2014
order, that order became final and binding as to all issues raised and which
could have been raised in that proceeding. See In re C.M., 166 N.H. 764, 781
(2014). The husband does not develop his argument that the 2014 order was
“void ab initio,” so we decline to address it. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47,
49 (2003).

We conclude that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion when
it denied the father’s motion to strike. We decline to address the merits of the
2014 order.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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