Cited by

Saulnier v. Fanaras Enterprises, 136 N.H. 565, 567, 618 A.2d 841, 842 (1992); Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 243, 186 A. 769, 769-70 (1936).

Thus, although the trial court has substantial discretion to set aside a verdict based on the weight of the evidence, Kierstead, 118 N.H. at 496, 389 A.2d at 431; Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 244, 186 A. 769, 770 (1936); Bennett v. Larose, 82 N.H. 443, 445, 136 A. 254, 255-56 (1926), the question of whether a judgment n.o.v.

Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 600-01, 529 A.2d 976, 982 (1987) (citing Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 245-46, 186 A. 769, 771 (1936)).

rdict solely on the ground of its inconsistency with the later one; our discussion and holding are likewise confined, and nothing in this opinion should be read to limit the authority of a trial court to examine one or both of two inconsistent verdicts as resting on plain mistake, being conclusively against the weight of the evidence or offending other recognized standards for post-verdict review.

In Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 245-46, 186 A. 769, 771 (1936), this court performed an important gloss on the BelknapBennett standard, calling into question the previous focus on the elements of mistake, partiality, and corruption: *601 “It seems confusing that the idea of mistake, partiality or corruption should be made an element for the court’

Indeed, where there is conflicting evidence, a motion to set aside will be denied unless the evidence is “so preponderantly in favor of the losing party as to disclose mistake, partiality or corruption on the part of the triers of fact.” Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 243, 186 A. 769, 770 (1936); see also Milford Etc. Company v. Railroad, 79 N.H. 525, 107 A. 313 (1919) (jury appeared not to have deliberated at all); Doody v. Railroad, 77 N.H. 161, 89 A. 487 (1914) (jury appeared to have igno

Co., 119 *137 N.H. 457, 466, 404 A.2d 1094, 1100 (1979) (quoting Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 245, 186 A. 769, 770 (1936)).

Thayer v. Thayer, 119 N.H. 871, 409 A.2d 1326 (1979); Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 243, 186 A. 769 -70 (1936).

The only question for this court is whether there was any evidence to reasonably support it.

What was said in Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 245, 186 A. 769, 770 (1936) bears repeating.

Eichel v. Payeur, 107 N.H. 194, 196 — 97, 219 A.2d 287, 288-89 (1966); Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 186 A. 769 (1936); see Hauser v. Calawa, 116 N.H. 676, 366 A.2d 489 (1976).

Compare Wendell v. Safford supra with Lisbon v. Bath, 21 N.H. 319, 335 (1850) [and] Lawrence v. Towle, 59 N.H. 28, 30 (1879) [and] Doody v. Railroad, 77 N.H. 161, 163, 89 A. 487, 489 (1914) [and] Bennett v. Larose, 82 N.H. 443, 448, 136 A. 254, 257 (1926) [and] Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 186 A. 769 (1936).

In this jurisdiction, the policy of discouraging defeated counsel from importuning jurors informally after verdict has never been thought to restrict the authority and duty of the trial judge “to correct or vacate what turns out to be an unfair result.” Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 245, 186 A. 769, 770 (1936).

The trial court held in abeyance a ruling on this motion stating, “I may grant it later on, depending on what happens.” “It is a feature of a jury trial for the trial judge not only to see that the trial is fairly conducted but also to correct or vacate what turns out to be an unfair result.” Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 245, 186 A. 769, 770 (1936); James, Civil Procedures.

Guptill v. Bergman, 108 N.H. 507, 240 A.2d 55 (1968); Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 186 A. 769 (1936).

Since there is evidence to support the jury verdict, the ruling by the presiding justice that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence is sustained.

The consideration by die Presiding Justice of the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict as inadequate “involved questions ol fact for the Judge and his decision should not be set aside unless no reasonable person would make it.” Roy v. Chalifoux, 95 N.H. 321, 324; see also Wisutskie v. Malouin, 88 N.H. 242, 246; Chagnon v. Union-Leader, 103 N.H. 426, 446.