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The finding of public necessity cannot be determined by comparing all public benefits of a proposed taking against each affected property owner individually.

While legislative findings bearing on the public purpose of a proposed taking “have no magical quality to make valid that which is invalid,” *803 Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 165, 106 A.2d 571, 573 (1954), the public policy considerations expressed by the General Court in relation to airport safety, see RSA 424:2 (1991), are entitled to weight in the commissioners’ public necessity determination.

The issues thus reflect the content of part I, article 12 of the Constitution of New Hampshire, limiting exercises of the eminent domain power to “public uses,” which has been interpreted to require the showing of a public purpose for any taking, see Merrill v. City of Manchester, 127 N.H. 234, 236, 499 A.2d 216, 217 (1985) (citing Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 165, 106 A.2d 571, 574 (1954)), and of a probable net benefit to the public if a taking occurs for the intended purpose, Merrill v. C

Under part I, article 12 of the State Constitution, the power of eminent domain may be exercised only if the condemned property is “applied to public uses.” Whether a particular use is a public use is a question of law to be resolved by the courts.

Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 168, 106 A.2d 571, 575 (1954) (citing Meredith v. Fullerton, 83 N.H. 124, 139 A. 359 (1927)).

The trial court’s ruling cited Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954), and Club Jolliet, Inc. v. Manchester & a., 110 N.H. 172, 262 A.2d 844 (1970), cases which generally affirmed the constitutionality of RSA chapters 203 and 205.

Consequently, because RSA 402:75 (Supp. 1979) is devoid of either a declared policy or a prescribed standard laid down by the legislature, see Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 167, 106 A.2d 571, 575 (1954); Firemen’s Insurance Co. v. Houle, 96 N.H. 30, 32, 69 A.2d 696, 698 (1949); Conway v. Water Resources Board, 89 N.H. 346, 352, 199 A. 83, 88 (1938), it represents an *862 unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by the General Court in violation of N.H. Const. pt.

Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571, 44 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1954); Club Joilet, Inc. v. Manchester, 110 N.H. 172, 262 A.2d 844 (1970).

Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954); Club Jolliet, Inc. v. Manchester, 110 N.H. 172, 262 A.2d 844 (1970).

.” Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 484, 490, 190 A. 425, 429 (1937); Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 165, 106 A.2d 571, 573 (1954); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 201, 304 A.2d 89 (1973).

In Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 165, 106 A.2d 571, 573 (1954), the weight to be given legislative findings and declarations is stated as follows: “These legislative findings and declarations have no magical quality to make valid that which is invalid but they are entitled to weight in construing the statute and in determining whether the statute promotes a public pur

” In 1954 Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N. H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 made clear two propositions: (1) that a redevelopment project constitutes “.