Cited by

at 218 (disbarring attorney for lying to PCC); Budnitz’ Case, 139 N.H. at 492-93 (disbarring attorney for lying to grand jury and PCC); cf. Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605-07 (1991) (disbarring attorney for using dishonest and fraudulent means to obtain commercial financing for his own home).

See, e.g., Cohen’s Case, 143 N.H. 169, 171-72 (1998) (disbarring attorney based upon referee’s finding that the attorney had repeatedly engaged in dishonest conduct, including, among other things, falsely answering bar counsel’s interrogatory); Ast les’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605 (1991) (holding that aggravation was warranted where respondent admitted, and the referee found, that the respondent had lied in correspondence to the PCC).

For instance, we disbarred the attorney in Wolterbeek’s Case, 152 N.H. 710, 717 (2005), where, in addition to acquiring three mortgages and becoming the holder of a note owed by his client, the attorney engaged “in a course of deceitful conduct toward a client and a tribunal over a span of several years with the intent to benefit himself.” Similarly, in Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 604-05 (1991), we disbarred an attorney who forged his wife’s signature on two mortgage applications; lied to a para

See, e.g., Coffey’s Case, 152 N.H. 503 (attorney disbarred for convincing an elderly client experiencing mental deterioration to convey to him property worth over $200,000 as payment for clearly excessive legal fees); Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602 (1991) (attorney disbarred for using fraudulent means to secure financing on own home and failing to subsequently disclose misconduct); Basbanes’ Case, 141 N.H. 1 (1996) (attorney disbarred for presenting false testimony to marital master in client’s divo

In determining the appropriate sanction, our focus is “not on punishing the offender but on protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the bar, and preventing similar conduct in the future.” Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605 (1991).

We must also assess what sanction is likely to prevent similar misconduct in the future.

Budnitz’s Case, 139 N.H. 489, 492, 658 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1995) (quotation omitted); see Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 606, 594 A.2d 167, 170 (1991).

We addressed these principles in Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 606, 594 A.2d 167, 170 (1991), when we stated: In today’s society, more than ever before, the legal profession touches and affects nearly every facet of private and public life.

To deter *811 mine the appropriateness of disbarment as a sanction, we examine the respondent’s behavior to gauge the gravity of his unprofessional conduct.

In this State, “[n]o single transgression reflects more negatively on the legal profession *7 than a lie.” Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 606, 594 A.2d 167, 170 (1991).

“The task of supervising and disciplining attorneys within this State falls squarely upon the shoulders of this court.” Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605, 594 A.2d 167, 170 (1991).

It matters not that the respondent’s mendacity before the committee was contained in a preliminary response, not presented at the hearing.

“[T]he task of supervising and disciplining attorneys within this State falls squarely upon the shoulders of this court.” Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605, 594 A.2d 167, 170 (1991).

“When faced with the decision of whether to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment, our focus rests, not on punishing the offender, but on protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the bar, and preventing similar conduct in the future.” Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605, 594 A.2d 167, 170 (1991).

is to protect the public, maintain public confidence in the bar, and preserve the integrity of the legal profession,” Henderson’s Case, 130 N.H. 313, 315, 538 A.2d 1222, 1224 (1988), and to prevent similar conduct in the future, Astles’ Case, 134 N.H. 602, 605, 594 A.2d 167, 170 (1991).