Cited by

(quotations, ellipsis, and brackets omitted); see also State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 750 (2001) (in determining whether State has purged taint of an unlawful detention followed by a consent to search, court considers temporal proximity between the police illegality and the consent to search, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct).

(quotations, ellipsis, and brackets omitted); see also State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 750 (2001) (in determining whether State has purged taint of an unlawful detention followed by a consent to search, court considers temporal proximity between the police illegality and the consent to search, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct).

State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 749 (2001) (quotation omitted).

“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.” State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 748 (2001).

He argues that his subsequent consent to search the vehicle was “tainted” by this unconstitutional detention.

State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 750-51 (2001) (considering the races of a Caucasian police officer and an African-American suspect in deciding whether the State purged the taint of an unlawful detention followed by a consent to search).

searches even though [she] signed a consent form for those searches.” She contends that we should apply the test that we developed in Hight, to determine the validity of a consent to search that was preceded by a violation of Part I, Article 19 and of the Fourth Amendment, to this case to determine 5 whether any taint of the Miranda violation was purged.

We have implicitly adopted the federal rule that, when consent is the product of an unlawful detention during a motor vehicle stop, such consent is “tainted” by the illegality of the detention.

Because the defendant consented to the search of the vehicle while unlawfully detained, his consent was ‘tainted’ by the illegality of the detention.

(quotation omitted) (holding that taint of illegal search of curtilage “was not purged before the defendant made incriminating statements to the police”); see also State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 751 (2001) (holding that the State had “failed to purge the taint of the defendant’s unlawful detention and that the evidence 6 procured through the defendant’s consent should have been suppressed”).

The scope of a stop may be expanded to investigate other suspected illegal activity only “if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 748-49 (2001) (quotation omitted).

romptness in order to lessen the possibility that the facts upon which probable cause was initially based do not become dissipated”); and (3) conducting traffic stops, see, e.g., State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 23, 24-25 (2004) (adopting three-part test to determine when police officer’s questions during traffic stop “turn[] a reasonable seizure into an unreasonable one”); State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 748-49 (2001) (observing, in dicta, that expanding the scope of traffic stop to includ

Thus, the rule does not apply in certain limited circumstances; e.g., if the State proves that the taint of the primary illegality is purged, State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 750 (2001), if the police have an independent source for the evidence untainted by their misconduct, State v. Holler, 123 N.H. 195, 200 (1983), or if the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence, State v. Hill 146 N.H. 568, 573 (2001).

[acquisition of the evidence sought to be suppressed]; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 750 (2001) (quotations omitted) (determining whether consent to search remained tainted by prior unlawful detention); see State v. Schrecengost, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (applying comparable factors to destruction of evidence case).

Reasonable articulable suspicion refers to suspicion based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from those facts.

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.

It is well settled that “[i]n order for a police officer to undertake an investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion — based on specific, articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from those facts — that the particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Right, 146 N.H. 746, 748 (2001) (quotation omitted).

State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 751 (2001) (recognizing that “we have previously admonished that it is good policy for police officers to advise persons that they have a right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search”).

Likewise, we acknowledge that the failure of the police to advise the defendant of his right to refuse consent may be considered in determining the validity of his consent.

*299 To be constitutional, an investigatory stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion.

aution under the circumstances to take” (quotations omitted)); State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 595-96 (1985) (questioning within scope because officer’s suspicion not yet dispelled and stop lasted three minutes); Glaude, 131 N.H. at 222 (permissible to ask defendant for name and vehicle registration because this was “the routine and prudent first step in any investigative stop”); cf. State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 748-49 (2001) (observing, in dicta, that “expansion of the scope of a motor vehicle st

See, e.g., State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 748 (2001) (officer making investigatory stop must have reasonable suspicion that the “person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity” (quotation omitted)).

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.

State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 748 (2001); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).

The defendant argues that his consent was “tainted” because it was obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure.

The State argues, for the first time on appeal, that the seizure was constitutional because it was supported by reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a motor vehicle offense.