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In New Hampshire, a personal injury award or settlement obtained by one spouse prior to divorce is divisible “regardless of the underlying purpose of the award or the loss it is meant to replace.” In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 49 (2001) (affirming the distribution at divorce of a personal injury settlement annuity); see also RSA 458:16-a, I (providing that 7 the property subject to division at divorce “include[s] all tangible and intangible property and assets, real or perso

While the court, in its discretion, may “consider when and by whom property was acquired in determining its distribution,” In the Matter of Sarvela & Sarvela, 154 N.H. 426, 431 (2006), “all property of the parties is subject to distribution, provided that it was acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or divorce,” In the Matter of Preston & Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 50 (2001).

In the Matter of Preston & Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 49-50 (2001).

Cohen, 172 N.H. at 84; see In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 49 (2001).

In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 51 (2001) (describing the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, which provides that “where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things.

In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 52 (2001).

A pension plan, “in its simplest form, is a promise by the employer to pay a periodic benefit (usually for life) to employees who meet the requirements set forth in the plan.” Steven R. Brown, An 2 In In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48 (2001), we declined to utilize the doctrine of ejusdem generis to determine whether a husband’s annuity constituted marital property.

We have said that it provides that “where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.” In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 51 (2001) (quotations omitted).

In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 52 (2001).

ent accounts as of the date of the final hearing, which took place before the decree was issued); In the Matter of Gordon & Gordon, 147 N.H. 693, 696-97 (2002) (concluding that trial court did not err in finding that husband’s contributions to retirement accounts made after the libel for divorce was filed, but before the decree issued, were marital property); In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 48-50 (2001) (finding that an annuity, acquired four years before the parties’ separati

See, e.g., In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 51 (2001).

In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 50-51 (2001) (holding that an annuity constitutes property subject to equitable distribution).

Valence stands in contrast to In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48 (2001), and In the Matter of Sukerman & Sukerman, 159 N.H. 565 (2009).

In support of this argument, he cites Fabich v. Fabich, 144 N.H. 577 (1999), overruled in part by In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48 (2001).

the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by classifying the [husband’s] interest in certain real estate parcels, timeshares and [a] dental practice as marital property”), *16 with In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 49 (2001) (“the trial court [did not] erroneously conclude that [an] annuity [owned by the husband] was marital property subject to equitable distribution”).

In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48,49 (2001).

In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 49-50 (2001).

In the Matter of Preston and Preston, 147 N.H. 48, 49 (2001).