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rmulate her opinion did not utilize standardized tests, and the results of the evaluations did not produce “quantifiable results that could then be compared to a standardized norm”); cf. Baxter v. Temple, 157 N.H. 280, 299 (2008) (concluding that the expert’s methodology was reliable, in part because it utilized a series of standardized assessments, all of which had been tested); State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723, 730-31 (2002) (concluding that a specific field sobriety test can and has been tested

ing of the eyes,” State v. Cochrane, 153 N.H. 420, 422 (2006), is, as a matter of law, scientifically-reliable, and that HGN test results may be admitted as circumstantial proof of intoxication through the testimony of the police officer who administered the test so long as the State establishes that the officer was trained in administering the test and properly administered it, State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723, 734-35 (2002).

To establish a proper foundation for the admission of HGN test results, the State must put forth evidence that the police officer who administered the HGN test is trained in the procedure and that the test was properly administered.

Cf State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723, 735 (2002) (results of HGN test only admissible if State establishes proper foundation, including that test was properly administered).

At trial, the defendant moved to strike evidence of the HGN test, arguing it was inadmissible because Lee testified that he did not administer it correctly.

The inquiry is a flexible one, and the focus “must be solely on the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723, 727 (2002) (quotation omitted).

29-a, 1(c)” by “requiring] a detailed assessment of whether Ms. Corson properly followed the ACE-V methodology in reaching her conclusion.” Alternatively, the State maintains that, “even if RSA 516:29-a, 1(c) required the trial court to evaluate Ms. Corson’s implementation of the ACE-V methodology in this case, the court erred in finding the application unreliable.” Relying upon State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723, 735 (2002), the defendant counters that “[u]nder [Rule] 702, it is not enough that the

Evidence need not be infallible to be admissible.

The defendant asserted that Beaudry was required to testify as an expert witness in order to establish a proper foundation for its admissibility pursuant to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 and State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723, 735 (2002).

The level of scrutiny we employ in our reliability inquiry will depend upon the complexity of the evidence involved and the impact the evidence likely will have on the trial itself.

If it is of aid to a judge or jury, its deficiencies or weaknesses are a matter of defense, which affect the weight of the evidence but do not determine its admissibility.

We generally review the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary matters with considerable deference, see State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723, 725-26 (2002), and will not reverse the trial court’s ruling on authentication absent an unsustainable exercise of its discretion.

We review the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary matters with considerable deference and will reverse the court’s decision only if its exercise of discretion is unsustainable.

Generally, we accord considerable deference to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings and will only intervene when they demonstrate an unsustainable exercise of discretion.