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The State repeatedly referred to the evidence in its closing argument, see State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 137-38 (2000) (error not harmless when “[t]he State specifically addressed [the disputed evidence] in its closing argument, reinforcing its significant prejudicial impact”), and the complainant was questioned at length during direct and cross-examination about the funeral incident, see Boudreau, 176 N.H. at ____ (sli

State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 137-38 (2000) (concluding error was not harmless where alternative evidence was not overwhelming and erroneously admitted evidence “was not inconsequential”).

The testimony concerning these acts, rather than the defendant’s admission to having a “perversion addiction,” carried a far greater potential of impacting the jurors’ emotions, appealing to their sense of outrage, and creating the impression that the defendant was a “pervert.” Cf. State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 136 (2000) (finding that admitted statement of defendant’s complicity in criminal acts more severe than the charged crimes created extreme risk of unfair prejudice).

See, e.g., State v. Ayotte, 146 N.H. 544, 549, 776 A.2d 715 (2001); State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 137, 756 A.2d 598 (2000).

directly linked to a determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant” (quotation omitted)), and State v. Hennessey, 142 N.H. 149, 159 (1997) (harmless error where the State did not “call particular attention to [the disputed evidence] in closing argument”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ramos, 149 N.H. 118 (2003), and State v. Quintero, 162 N.H. 526 (2011), with State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 137-38 (2000) (error not harmless when “[t]he State specifically addressed [the disput

“An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight, and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt.” State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 137 (2000) (quotation omitted).

Juries are presumed to follow instructions.

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.

We note, however, that although evidence may be relevant, it may have minimal probative value.

4 WEINSTEIN & Berger, supra § 609.05[2], “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.” State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 136 (2000) (quotation omitted).

“An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight, and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt.” State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 137 (2000) (quotation omitted).

State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 136 (2000) (finding defendant’s statements to be prejudicial).

“An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight, and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt.” State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 137 (2000) (quotation omitted).

State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 135-36 (2000); Lambert, 147 N.H. at 296.

State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 136 (2000); Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 430 (1987).

State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 136 (2000); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

“To show an abuse of discretion, the [petitioner] must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of [her] case.” State v. Pelkey, 145 N.H. 133, 135 (2000) (quotation omitted).