Cited by

State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 224-25 (2001) (holding that the probative value of the disputed evidence was reduced by other evidence offered for the same purpose).

In support, the defendant relies on State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221 (2001), as an example of a prejudice so strong that this court concluded a limiting instruction was insufficient to prevent it.

Evidence that a sexual assault victim previously disclosed the assault to others may be admissible to contradict inferences from the victim’s delay in reporting the assault to law enforcement.

State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 226 (2001) (concluding that evidence of prior disclosures of sexual assault is relevant and admissible under some circumstances).

Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution “requires that an indictment describe the offense with sufficient specificity to ensure that the defendant can prepare for trial and avoid double jeopardy.” State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 227 (2001) (quotation omitted).

State v.  For a discussion of the fresh complaint doctrine, see State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 226 (2001), wherein we upheld a decision to allow the victim to testify to the fact of earlier disclosures of sexual abuse.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion when it admitted evidence of the defendant’s statement to the victim that he was “disgusting.” Given our disposition of this appeal, we decline to address the defendant’s remaining arguments as they are unlikely to arise again on remand.

“We have recognized in recent years that victims of sexual assaults may not immediately disclose them.” State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 226 (2001).

Brum, 155 N.H. at 413; see, e.g., State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 224-25 (2001) (evidence that defendant had engaged in a homosexual relationship had limited probative value as to the facts of the case and was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because of potential juror bias against homosexuals).

having previously been convicted of a felony against the property of another, and a felony relating to controlled drugs “Part I, Article 15 [of the State Constitution] requires that an indictment describe the offense with sufficient specificity to ensure that the defendant can prepare for trial and avoid double jeopardy.” State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 227 (2001) (quotation omitted).

Although the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to reconsider and vacate may have been within its sound discretion, see State v. Winn, 141 N.H. 812, 814 (1997); State v. Houle, 120 N.H. 160, 161 (1980), we will address the merits of his constitutional claim in the interest of judicial economy.

A decision concerning its issuance is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless the defendant can demonstrate that the ruling was *77 clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.” State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 227 (2001).

The defendant argues that evidence of his request for the girls to kiss one another was an invitation to the jury to make the inferential leap proscribed in State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221 (2001).

To establish that the trial court committed an unsustainable exercise of discretion, “the defendant must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.” State v. Woodard, 146 N.H. 221, 224 (2001).