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Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Nault v. N & L Development Co., 767 A.2d 406.

16 citing documents.

  • In re Estate of Jack Michael Bergquist 166 N.H. 531 N.H. 2014
    Co., 146 N.H. 35, 36, 39 (2001); see also Lombard v. Company, 78 N.H. 280, 283 (1916) (referring to this state’s long and uninterrupted practice of allowing post-judgment interest).
  • In the Matter of the Liquidation of The Home Insurance Company 89 A.3d 165 N.H. 2014
    We have previously indicated that “legislative history suggests that RSA 524:1-a and:1-b were intended to provide the same protection to prevailing parties.” Nault v. N & L Dev.
  • J & M Lumber & Construction Co. v. Smyjunas 20 A.3d 947 N.H. 2011
    Co., 146 N.H. 35, 37, 39 (2001) (explaining that both pre- and post-judgment interest are available under RSA 524:l-a and RSA 524:l-b).
  • Kierstead v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 7 A.3d 1268 N.H. 2010
    Co., 146 N.H. 35, 38 (2001) (quotation omitted), we have construed RSA 407:22 as setting forth the twelve-month limitations period and RSA 407:15 as requiring an insurer to give notice of this period before relying upon it.
  • In Re Aube 969 A.2d 338 N.H. 2009
    RSA 336:1 (Supp. 2008); RSA 524:l-a,:l-b (2007); Nault v. N & L. Dev.
  • State v. Lavoie 924 A.2d 370 N.H. 2007
    Co., 146 N.H. 35, 38 (2001), and we so hold.
  • In re Giacomini 868 A.2d 283 N.H. 2005
    The dissent also cites Nault v. N & L Development Co., 146 N.H. 35, 36 (2001), for the proposition that an award of post-judgment interest should be discretionary.
  • Starr v. Governor 864 A.2d 348 N.H. 2004
    In this case, this principle is bolstered by our previous interpretation of RSA 524:1-b, in which we examined its legislative history and found that the legislature had expressed its intent that interest was to be awarded “in all cases where the trial court awarded money to the party entitled to be compensated.” Nault v. N & L Dev.
  • In re Juvenile 2003-189 834 A.2d 271 N.H. 2003
  • In re Coderre 807 A.2d 1245 N.H. 2002
  • Pennelli v. Town of Pelham 807 A.2d 1256 N.H. 2002
  • Rodgers v. Colby's Ol' Place, Inc. 802 A.2d 1159 N.H. 2002
  • In re Nyhan 802 A.2d 1183 N.H. 2002
    RSA 524:1-a (1997),:1-b (Supp. 2001); RSA ch. 336; Nault v. N & L Dev.
  • Contoocook Valley School District v. Graphic Arts Mutual Insurance 788 A.2d 259 N.H. 2001
    ‘When reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we consider the pleadings and any accompanying affidavits, and all proper inferences drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nault v. N & L Dev.
  • State v. Burr 782 A.2d 914 N.H. 2001
    “Restitution may be ordered regardless of the offender’s ability to pay and regardless of the availability of other compensation, however, restitution is not intended to compensate the victim more than once for the same injury.” RSA 651:63, I. We examine this language “not in isolation, but in the context of the overall statutory scheme.” Nault v. N & L Dev.
  • Lord v. Lovett 770 A.2d 1103 N.H. 2001
    We also note that we are not called upon, today, to consider the interaction of two separate statutes as we were in Nault v. N & L Development Co., 146 N.H. 35 (2001), but rather to determine *238 whether an important substantive right to recover for the injury of lost opportunity is encompassed by one statute.