Cited by

Although the purchase and sale agreement, apparently entered into after the defendant filed his appeal, is not part of the record, see Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001), if the defendant in fact sold the property while the appeal was pending, the town’s entitlement to declaratory or injunctive relief may be academic or dead.

Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001) (“On appeal, we consider only evidence and documents presented to the trial court.”).

We will interpret a contract according to the common meaning of its words and phrases and judge the intent of the parties by objective criteria rather than the “unmanifested states of mind of the parties.” Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 715 (2001) (quotation omitted).

We note that on appeal, we consider only the “papers and exhibits filed and considered in the proceedings in the trial court.” Sup.

Ct. R. 13; Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001) (“On appeal, we consider only evidence and documents presented to the trial court.”).

Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001) (“On appeal, we consider only evidence and documents presented to the trial court.”); Sup.

Ct. R. 13; Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001) (observing that we consider evidence and documents that were presented to the trial court).

Additionally, “[o]n appeal, we consider only evidence and documents presented to the trial court.” Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001).

Rather, she must set forth “specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 715 (2001) (quotation omitted).

We do not, however, consider the documents attached to the reply memorandum that were not presented to the trial court.

Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001); see Sup.

Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001) (affirming the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff “lacked standing to bring his common law claim of trespass because he failed to offer proof that his possessory interest had been disturbed” (emphasis added)).

We “judge the intent of the parties by objective criteria rather than the unmanifested states of mind of the parties.” Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 715 (2001) (quotation omitted).

1962); see Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 716 (2001) (“In evaluating whether a party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the [party] suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect.” (quotation omitted)).

In Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 717 (2001), interpreting an almost identical predecessor statute, see RSA 539:1 (Supp. 1994) (repealed 1995), we held that a tenancy did not qualify as “land of another” for the purposes of section I of the statute.

“In evaluating whether a party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the plaintiff suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect.” Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 716 (2001) (quotation omitted).

Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 715 (2001) (quotation omitted); see also Barnes, 128 N.H. at ] 07.

We therefore decline to address it.