Cited by

15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, an elementary and 3 fundamental requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 423 (1999) (quotation omitted).

In denying the motion to reconsider, the Trial Court (Rauseo, J.) specifically found that, in fact, the “e[-]filing records show the plaintiff opened the Hearing Notice on 1/09/23 at 6:59 p.m.” On these facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion or erred as a matter of law by entering default and declining to strike the default for good cause.

“Under both Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 423 (1999) (quotation omitted).

In the divorce context, notice must give the parties actual notice of the hearing and the issues to be addressed.

Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion or erred as a matter of law by entering default for the defendant’s failure to attend the pretrial hearing.

We have previously explained that “[i]n equity proceedings such as divorce, actions that would constitute a default at law technically result in a judgment pro confesso in equity,” which “results in the admission of all material and well- pleaded allegations of fact.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 426 (1999) (citation and quotation omitted).

White v. Auger, 171 N.H. 660, 665 (2019); Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999).

We need not reach these arguments, however, because we conclude that their claims fail on other grounds.

Complaints about adverse rulings without developed legal argument are insufficient to warrant appellate review.

The petitioner next argues that “[c]onsidering the full value of the company while awarding alimony constitutes a double credit for the Respondent as she is being paid both alimony and for an interest in that ability to earn monies.” The petitioner fails, however, to sufficiently develop that argument for our review.

Under both Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, “an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 423 (1999) (quotation omitted).

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (holding that complaints about adverse rulings without developed legal argument are insufficient to warrant appellate review).

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 428 (1999) (“[A]s a general rule, a trial judge who has recused himself or herself should take no other action in the case except the necessary ministerial acts to have the case transferred to another judge.” (Quotation and brackets omitted.)).

“[I]n the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of 4 complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (citation omitted); see Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499 (1988) (explaining that “off-hand invocations” of constitutional rights supported by neither argument nor authority warrant no extended consideration).

“[I]n the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (citation omitted); see Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499 (1988) (“off-hand invocations” of constitutional rights supported by neither argument nor authority warrant no extended consideration).

The trial court has the authority to default a party for material noncompliance with its orders.

We review a ruling on default under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.

Second, “in the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (citation omitted); see Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499 (1988) (“off-hand invocations” of constitutional rights supported by neither argument nor authority warrant no extended consideration).

“[I]n the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (citation omitted).

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 422 (1999); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001).

competing considerations.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 425 (1999) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Thus, even assuming that it was error for the judge to rule upon the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, see Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 428 (1999) (noting that “as a general rule, a trial judge who has recused himself [or herself] should take no other action in the case except the necessary ministerial acts to have the case transferred to another judge” (quotation omitted)), the error was harmless.

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (“[A] mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” (citation omitted)).

Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377-79; see also Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 423 (1999).

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (“We hold that in the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” (citation omitted)).

Mother’s remaining arguments either do not warrant judicial review because they lack developed legal argument, Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999), or are without merit and do not warrant further discussion, Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Because the Federal Constitution offers the petitioner no greater protection under these circumstances, we reach the same conclusion under both constitutions.

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (“[A] mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” (citation omitted)).

“[I]n the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (citation omitted); see Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499 (1988) (“offhand invocations” of constitutional rights supported by neither argument nor authority warrant no extended consideration).

Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 427 (1999) (court did not reach assertion of error in disqualifying defendant’s brother as next friend and co-counsel because it upheld the trial court’s decision upon other grounds).

Furthermore, it makes no effort to appraise the seemingly comprehensive nature of the public accommodations law, and instead relies upon the bald assertion that “[statutes that are remedial] in nature such as [workers’] compensation and unemployment security are distinguishable.” Without adequate appellate argument, we decline to address the Lodge’s argument any further.

*49 Second, “in the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (citation omitted).

“Adverse rulings against the defendant in the same or a prior judicial proceeding do not render the judge biased.” Matter of Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 116 (5th Cir. 1993); see Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999).

Due process, however, does not require perfect notice, but only “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 423 (1999) (quotation omitted).

This is all the *440 procedure due process requires.

“[A] mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429 (1999) (citation omitted); see also State v. Chick, 141 N.H. 503, 504 (1996) (passing reference to constitutional claim renders argument waived); Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499 (1988) (“off-hand invocations” of constitutional rights supported by neither argument nor authority warrant no extende

Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, we will not reverse a default ruling.

Previously, we have recognized that “[i]n equity proceedings such as divorce, actions that would constitute a default at law technically result in a judgment pro confesso in equity.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 426, 728 A.2d 215, 220 (1990) (citation omitted).

State v. Bennett, 144 N.H. 13, 22, 737 A.2d 640, 647 (1999) (vague and insubstantial arguments will not be addressed); Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429, 728 A.2d 215, 222 (1999) (court will not consider mere laundry list of complaints); Vogel, 137 N.H. at 322, 627 A.2d at 596 (court will not address in detail meritless issues).

laintiffs’ constitutional questions under our State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1983), and “because the State Constitution provides at least as much protection as the Federal Constitution in this instance, we need not conduct a separate federal analysis.” In re 1991 Chevrolet Cavalier, 142 N.H. 705, 707, 708 A.2d 397, 398 (1998); see Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 423-24, 728 A.2d 215, 218-19 (1999).

A decree pro confesso is merely an interlocutory order that results in the admission of all material and well-pleaded allegations of fact, see Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 426, 728 A.2d 215, 220 (1999), but not conclusions of law, see O’Brien, 141 N.H. at 524, 687 A.2d at 264.

Due process does not require perfect notice, but only “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 423, 728 A.2d 215, 218-19 (1999) (quotation omitted).

“It is important that cases be decided on their merits, that a party have his day in court and that rules of practice and procedure shall be tools in aid of the promotion of justice rather than barriers and traps for its denial.” Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 425, 728 A.2d 215, 219 (1999) (quotation omitted).

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner’s remaining arguments are either meritless and warrant no further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322, 627 A.2d 595, 596 (1993), or not supported by developed legal argument and will not be addressed, see Douglas v. Douglas, 143 N.H. 419, 429, 728 A.2d 215, 222 (1999).

Because the defendant fails to raise any arguments in his brief concerning the alleged deprivation of due process, we address only the issues concerning his rights to a fair trial and to testify in his own defense.