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[¶7] “Unless some reference is made to chapter 541 in any given statute, an appeal under the provisions of chapter 541 is not authorized by law.” Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999) (quotation omitted).

We have interpreted the phrase “when so authorized by law” to mean that the provisions of chapter 541 do not provide an appeal from the determination of every administrative agency in the state.

“Appeals from administrative proceedings may be taken under RSA chapter 541 only when so authorized by law.” Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999) (quotation and brackets omitted); see RSA 541:2 (2007).

consider a preliminary issue raised by the State Board; specifically, the State Board “seeks clarification as to whether a party can appeal, under RSA [chapter] 541, a [State] Board finding of manifest educational hardship under RSA 193:3.” I. Appellate Review “Appeals from administrative proceedings may be taken under RSA chapter 541 only when so authorized by law.” Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999) (quotation and brackets omitted); see RSA 541:2 (2007).

Petition of Guardarramos-Cepeda, 154 N.H. 7, 8-9 (2006) (considering a discretionary appeal wrongfully brought under Rule 7 as a Rule 11 petition for a writ of certiorari); Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999) (accepting an appeal of an administrative decision mistakenly filed under Rule 10 as a petition for a writ of certiorari because “[i]t is well-established that our practice permits consideration of their petition as one for writ of certiorari” (quotation omitted)); Appeal of Tamm, 12

As an initial matter, we address the jurisdictional basis for our review.

Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999); RSA 541:2 (2007) (appeal from administrative proceedings can be made under RSA chapter 541 only “[w]hen so authorized by law”).

authorized by law.” Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999) (quotation and brackets omitted).

On questions of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of a statute taken as a whole.

Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

On questions of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.

In any statutory interpretation case, we determine the legislature’s intent by turning first to the language in the statute itself.

Because we reverse on statutory grounds, we do not address the juvenile’s constitutional argument that he was unfairly surprised by the finding of true on the uncharged offense.

RSA 541:2 provides: “When so authorized by law, any order or decision of the commission may be the subject of a motion for rehearing or of an appeal in the manner prescribed by the following sections.” We have stated that “[ajppeals from administrative proceedings may be taken under RSA chapter 541 only when so authorized by law.” In re Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534 (1999) (quotation omitted); see also Petition of Larden, 134 N.H. 594, 597 (1991) (unless reference is made to chapter 541 in any given s

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 535, 727 A.2d 1001, 1002-03 (1999) (quotation omitted).

“We review the [ALPC’s] decision to determine whether [it] acted illegally with respect to jurisdiction, *347 authority or observance of the law, whereby it arrived at a conclusion which could not legally or reasonably be made, or abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously.” Petition of Hoyt, 143 N.H. 533, 534, 727 A.2d 1001, 1002 (1999) (quotation and brackets omitted).