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To establish common law fraud under New Hampshire law, “a plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a representation with knowledge of its falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the intention to cause another to rely upon it.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 77 (2000).

“A plaintiff cannot allege fraud in general terms, but must specifically allege the essential details of the fraud and the facts of the defendants’ fraudulent conduct.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 77 (2000).

We will not, however, assume the truth or accuracy of any allegations that are not well-pleaded, including the statement of conclusions of fact and principles of law.

“We will not, however, assume the truth or accuracy of any allegations which are not well-pleaded, including the statement of conclusions of fact and principles of law.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 76 (2000) (quotation omitted).

Thus, in a common law fraud action, the party bringing the claim must establish that it was personally harmed by the defendant’s conduct, prove justifiable reliance, and “specifically allege the essential details of the fraud and the facts of the defendants’ fraudulent conduct.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 77 (2000).

id.; see also Cross v. Brown, 148 N.H. 485, 487 (2002); Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 79 (2000).

“To establish fraud, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a representation with knowledge of its falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the intention to cause another to rely upon it.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 77 (2000).

“To establish fraud, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a representation with knowledge of its falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the intention to cause another to rely upon it.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 77 (2000).

When reviewing a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, we assume the truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and construe all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to him.

We will not, however, assume the truth or accuracy of any allegations which are not well-pleaded, including conclusions of fact and principles of law.

Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 79 (2000); Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 715-16 (1995); cf. also RSA 352:10 (2009) (expressly providing a civil remedy for violations of RSA 352:7 (2009) and RSA 352:8 (2009) relative to the obligations of an art dealer).

To sufficiently allege a claim of fraud, the plaintiff must allege that Liberatore “made a representation with knowledge of its falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the intention to cause [her] to rely upon it.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 77 (2000).

We do not, however, credit allegations that are not well- pleaded, “including the statement of conclusions of fact and principles of law.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 76 (2000).

Specifically, we have: (1) recognized that “[t]rade” and “commerce” as defined by the act “include[s] acts incidental to the sale of real estate,” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 80-81 (2000); see RSA 358-A:1, II (2009); (2) considered whether a particular real estate transaction occurred “in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” Hughes v. DiSalvo, 143 N.H. 576, 577- 79 (1999) (quotation and emphasis omitted); and (3) determined whether conduct relating to the sale and development of condomi

When reviewing a trial court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we assume all allegations in the plaintiff’s pleadings to be true and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

We do not, however, credit allegations that are not well-pleaded, “including the statement of conclusions of fact and principles of law.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 76 (2000) (quotation omitted).

We will not, however, assume the truth or accuracy of any allegations which are not well- pleaded, including conclusions of fact and principles of law.

We do not, however, credit allegations that are not well-pleaded, “including the statement of conclusions of fact and principles of law.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 76 (2000) (quotation omitted).

We will not, however, assume the truth or accuracy of any allegations which are not well-pleaded, including statements of conclusions of fact and principles of law.

The elements of such a claim are a negligent misrepresentation of a material fact by the defendant and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff.

To prevail, AJkwa Vista was required to prove that the defendants made a representation with knowledge of its falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the intention to cause Akwa Vista to rely upon it and that Akwa Vista justifiably relied upon it.

We cannot equate the Kelton defendant’s “good faith mistake,” Kelton, 155 N.H. at 669, with, in the trial court’s words, the defendant’s “rather cavalier attitude.” Moreover, in Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73 (2000), we held that allegations of misrepresentation of material facts made to induce another to enter into a contract by one who “had reason to know that she did not have sufficient knowledge to make such statements and, [who] therefore, made such statements with reckless disregard for

The party seeking to prove fraud must establish that the other party “made a representation with knowledge of its falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the intention to cause another to rely upon it.” Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 77 (2000).

Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 78 (2000); Barrett Assocs.

Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 79 (2000) (absent legislature’s express or implied intent to create private right of action, we will conclude that statute does not do so).