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The trial court has discretion to fashion a remedy for a discovery violation.

“[T]he supervisory authority of the trial court includes the power to impose the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice only in extraordinary situations and only where the government’s misconduct has prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 279 (1998) (brackets and quotation omitted).

Although we affirm the trial court’s decision not to impose the harshest of penalties — the dismissal of the defendant’s pending charges — we do not condone the State’s conduct.

State v. Chace, 151 N.H. 310, 314 (2004); State v. Bain, 145 N.H. 367, 372 (2000); State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 279 (1998), superseded on other grounds by rule as recognized in State v. Mottola, 166 N.H. 173, 176 (2014).

see RSA 135:17-a, I (providing that if, after hearing, trial court finds defendant is incompetent and cannot be restored to competency within 12 months, case shall be dismissed without prejudice); State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 279 (1998) (stating extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice reserved for extraordinary circumstances when government’s misconduct has prejudiced defendant).

In arguing that “good cause” remains the standard, the defendant relies upon Petition of State of N.H. (State v. Fischer), 152 N.H. 205, 209 (2005), State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 278-79 (1998), and State v. Hayes, 138 N.H. 410, 411 (1994).

State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 283 (1998); State v. Tucker, 132 N.H. 31, 33 (1989).

When a court dismisses a case for prosecutorial misconduct, absent actual prejudice and consideration of lesser remedies, the defendant benefits from a windfall, and the price is paid by the public, not the prosecutor.

aying] the proceedings for a sufficiently lengthy period of time to allow a conclusion to be reached that the discovery disclosure, originally too late, could then be deemed timely and harmless.” While acknowledging our concern that the sanction of dismissal with prejudice affords a criminal defendant a windfall, the price of which is paid by the public rather than the State, see State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 281 (1998), the defendant argues that dismissal was appropriate in this ease and the t

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to its findings of fact but review its conclusions of law de novo.

Because the Federal Constitution provides no greater protection in this area than does the State Constitution, see Chaisson, 123 N.H. at 29; Judd, 813 F.2d at 497, we need not undertake a separate federal analysis.

The same standard applies to the review of a discovery sanction.

reserved for extraordinary circumstances,” State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 281 (1998), and may be imposed only upon a showing of prejudice.

On appeal, the State argues that dismissal of the charges against the defendant as a sanction for perceived misconduct by Officer Talatinian was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion under the principles we announced in State v. Cotell, 143 N.H. 275, 722 A.2d *370 507 (1998).