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Analysis A. Standing The Town argues that Shaw’s lacks standing to seek a tax abatement because, as a tenant, Shaw’s is not liable for the taxes on the value of the land unless it agreed to pay them — something, the Town contends, Shaw’s had not agreed to do.

N.H. Right to Life v. Dir., N.H. Charitable Trusts Unit, 169 N.H. 95, 102 (2016) (arguments not briefed are waived on appeal); see also Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 249-50 (1998) (explaining that an analysis of whether an agreement constitutes a perpetual lease must begin with a review of the language of the agreement itself).

Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 253 (1998) (holding that municipality could not assess tax against lessees of real properties where relevant leases did not provide for the payment of property taxes, and explaining that “the plain language of RSA 72:23, I, reveals that it contains.

The arbitrator considered purportedly conflicting case law in New Hampshire on the subject of taxation of property leased by a municipality; namely, Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246 (1998), on the one hand, and Rochester I, Rochester II, and Verizon New England v. City of Rochester, 156 N.H. 624 (2007), on the other.

Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 253 (1998) (cautioning against “imputing too much weight to comments of proponents of bills offered in legislative committee hearings” (quotation omitted)).

RSA 73:10; Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 249 (1998) (finding that leasehold interests are taxable if the leases are either perpetual, renewable indefinitely or the leaseholder agrees to pay taxes on the value of the land).

“[W]e will set *351 aside an order of the board if we find that it misapprehended or misapplied the law.” Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 248 (1998); see RSA 76:16-a, V. On appeal, the taxpayers assign five errors to the board’s decision.

f section 3.15 was not ambiguous and that “[i]t includes the contractor, in this case the plaintiff, as well as any subcontractors in the category of persons or entities that are prohibited from placing any prejudgment lien on the facility.” “The interpretation of a contract, including whether a contract term is ambiguous, is ultimately a question of law for this court to decide.” Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 249 (1998) (quotation omitted).

Likewise, the interpretation of a contract, such as the bond at issue, is ultimately a question of law for this court to decide.

Likewise, the interpretation of a contract, such as the bond at issue, is ultimately a question of law for this court to decide.

Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 249 (1998) (citation, quotation and brackets omitted).

“Basic statutory construction rules require that all of the words of a statute must be given effect and that the legislature is presumed not to have used *368 superfluous or redundant words.” Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 252 (1998) (quotation omitted).

When interpreting a contract, absent fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or ambiguity, the parties’ intent will be determined from the plain meaning of the language used in the contract.

“Our standard of review for appeals from the board provides that the petitioner has the burden of showing that the board’s decision is clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all findings of the board upon all questions of fact shall be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable.” Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 248, 722 A.2d 489, 491 (1999) (quotation omitted).

Absent, ambiguity, however, the parties’ intent will be determined from the plain meaning of the language used in the contract.

Appeal of Reid, 143 N.H. 246, 253, 722 A.2d 489, 494 (1998) (quotation omitted).