Cited by

at 520; see also State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 660-61 (1999).

During this exercise, we “can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 644 (1999) (quotation omitted).

State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 647 (1999) (explaining that under the United States Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause “determination of the proper unit of prosecution is a function of the legislature’s intent” (quotation and brackets omitted)); State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 455 (1989) (noting that “our review of the defendant’s double jeopar

“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the exclusion from trial of evidence derivatively obtained through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 650 (1999) (quotation omitted).

We have previously observed that “[t]he determination of the age of the subjects in [a] photograph is for the trier of fact, relying on everyday observations and common experiences.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 646 (1999) (quotation omitted) (decided under prior version of RSA 649-A:3).

“[W]e first examine the language found in the statute and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 643 (1999) (quotation omitted).

“The proper analysis is not whether every possible conclusion has been excluded but, rather, whether other rational conclusions based on the evidence have been excluded.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 658 (1999).

If the evidence in question has been obtained only through the exploitation of an antecedent illegality, it must be suppressed.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 650 (1999) (quotations and citation omitted).

“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine requires the exclusion from trial of evidence derivatively obtained through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 650 (1999) (quotation omitted).

When a statutory provision is ambiguous, the rule of lenity demands that all doubt be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses and thereby expanding the statutory penalty.

State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 647 (1999) (federal double jeopardy analysis); see Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (1978).

We emphasize, however, that “[t]he proper analysis is not whether every possible conclusion has been excluded but, rather, whether other rational conclusions based on the evidence have been excluded.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 658 (1999).

See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 650 (1999) (The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine requires that evidence derivatively obtained through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution be excluded from trial).

The proper analysis is not whether every possible conclusion has been excluded, but rather whether other rational conclusions based upon the evidence have been excluded.

To obtain a search warrant, the police must show that at the time of the application for the warrant there is a substantial likelihood of finding the items sought; they need not establish with certainty that the search will lead to the desired result.

We consider the defendant’s claims under our State Constitution and use federal law only as an analytic aid.

“When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to words used.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 643 (1999) (quotation omitted).

‘When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 643 (1999) (quotation omitted).

‘When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 643 (1999) (quotation omitted).

State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 647 (1999) (federal double jeopardy analysis); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (1978).

er than adopting a per se rule suppressing evidence obtained during a consent search that stems from an unlawful detention, however, we ask “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 650 (1999) (quotation omitted).

Also, in State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 647 (1999), we determined that multiple counts of child pornography could be sustained because the prosecution had presented different photographic evidence for each count against the defendant.

We first consider the defendant’s arguments under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, “using federal case law only as an aid to our analysis.” State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 649, 732 A.2d 425, 435 (1999) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Thus, the town argues that the plaintiffs’ failure to file a petition that was “duly verified” within the thirty-day filing period “divested the Superior Court of jurisdiction to hear this matter.” In ascertaining legislative intent, we look first to the words of the statute, ascribing to them their plain meaning wherever possible.