Cited by

State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 679 (2000) (rejecting “the defendant’s parsing of the indictment”).

State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 679 (2000) (“reject[ing] the defendant’s parsing of the indictment” in favor of “[a] fair reading of [it]”).

State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 679 (2000) (rejecting the defendant’s interpretation of the indictment).

Because the petitioner claims only that her due process rights under the State Constitution have been violated, we address her arguments solely under that constitution, using federal authority only to aid in our analysis.

Because the petitioner claims only that her due process rights under the State Constitution have been violated, we address her arguments solely under that constitution, using federal authority only to aid in our analysis.

State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 676 (2000); see also State v. Sanborn, 168 N.H. 400, 424 (2015) (finding no double jeopardy violation where defendant was convicted of manslaughter and a lesser including offense because he was sentenced only for manslaughter).

We first articulated that test in Heald v. Perrin, 123 N.H. 468 (1983), superseded on other grounds by RSA 651:2, II- g, as stated in State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673 (2000).

Absent a determination of insufficiency, a declaration of a mistrial based upon a genuinely deadlocked jury, which we have held constitutes manifest necessity, see Kornbrekke, 156 N.H. at 830; see also Hartford, 132 N.H. at 585, “is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy,” Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326; see also Liakos, 142 N.H. at 730; State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 677-78 (2000).

We have previously determined that each of the statutory variants of sexual assault listed under RSA 632-A:2,1, “requires proof of an element or elements the others do not.” State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 678 (2000) (quotation omitted).

State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 677-78 (2000) (noting that “when a mistrial is granted on one charge due to jury deadlock, an acquittal on the other does not, in itself, bar retrial for the deadlocked charge because jury deadlock prevents original jeopardy from terminating on that charge”).

*338 A single act, however, may theoretically constitute one or more of the variants of RSA 641:6 and, thus, the State may “simultaneously prosecute multiple charges which constitute the same offense based on a single act or transaction provided it seeks a single conviction and each charge alleges a distinct, alternative method of committing the offense.” State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 676 (2000).

*830 Potentially disqualifying information aside, the record supports a declaration of a mistrial based upon jury deadlock, and, thus, by manifest necessity, State v. Hartford, 132 N.H. 580, 584 (1989), which “prevents original jeopardy from terminating on that charge.” State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 677-78 (2000).

V. Double jeopardy concerns may arise in a variety of circumstances, the most common of which include: (1) the simultaneous prosecution of multiple charges for the same offense; and (2) the subsequent prosecution of a charge involving the same underlying conduct previously prosecuted by the State.

The trial court may require the State to elect between alternative charges or, if the State refuses, may quash some of the charges, when trial upon multiple counts or indictments would prejudice either the defendant’s ability to prepare to meet the charges or the jury’s ability to deal with them intelligently and dispassionately.

Part I, Article 16 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that “no subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for the same crime or offense.” Thus, double jeopardy bars the State from pursuing a second prosecution stemming from the same conduct or events charged in a previous prosecution if the charges constitute the same offense.

As a general rule, it is true that “double jeopardy precludes the State from pursuing a second prosecution *446 stemming from the same conduct or events charged in a previous prosecution provided the charges constitute the same offense.” State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 677 (2000).

Part I, Article 16 of the New Hampshire Constitution protects an accused against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.

We confine our analysis to the State Constitution because the defendant *200 does not raise a claim under the Federal Constitution.

“Part I, Article 16 of the State Constitution protects an accused against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the *793 same offense.” State v. Nickles, 144 N.H. 673, 676 (2000) (quotation omitted).