Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Parker, 702 A.2d 306.

13 citing documents.

  • State of New Hampshire v. Philip Brown N.H. 2019
    RSA 265-A:10 (2014); State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322-24 (1997) (upholding State’s closing argument and trial court’s jury instruction stating that jury could consider refusal to take alcohol concentration test as evidence of intoxication).
  • State of New Hampshire v. Michael Flynn N.H. 2017
    a couple of times” after restarting; (6) the officer smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle and on the defendant’s breath; and (7) the defendant refused to take an alcohol concentration test, see State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322-23 (1997) (stating that a fact finder may infer from the defendant’s refusal to take an alcohol concentration test that “the defendant 6 did not take the test.
  • State v. Addison 165 N.H. 381 N.H. 2013
    tors: “(1) whether the prosecutor’s misconduct was *548 isolated and/or deliberate; (2) whether the trial court gave a strong and explicit cautionary instruction; and (3) whether any prejudice surviving the court’s instruction likely could have affected the outcome of the case.” Ellsworth, 151 N.H. at 155 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 122 (1st Cir. 2000)); cf. State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322 (1997) (citing federal standard for reviewing a defendant’s due process challenge
  • State v. Saunders 55 A.3d 1014 N.H. 2012
    “Due process requires that the State prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322 (1997); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
  • State v. Stowe 34 A.3d 678 N.H. 2011
    State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322 (1997); cf. State v. Watkins, 148 N.H. 760, 769 (2002) (curative instruction appropriate where prosecutor “blatantly misstated the law”).
  • State v. Leveille 7 A.3d 1175 N.H. 2010
    State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 321 (1997); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-02 (1975).
  • State v. Johnson 951 A.2d 146 N.H. 2008
    The defendant does not challenge this portion of the trial court’s instruction, and we have previously upheld similar instructions.
  • State v. Littlefield 876 A.2d 712 N.H. 2005
    See, e.g., State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324-25 (1997); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-76 (1975); United States v. Smith, 145 F.3d 458, 460 (1st Cir.), cert.
  • State v. Evans 839 A.2d 8 N.H. 2003
    State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324 (1997) (jury instructions are *422 appropriate when they accurately state law and allow jury to exercise its own judgment in evaluating conflicting evidence).
  • State v. Patten 813 A.2d 497 N.H. 2002
    “We have long recognized the rule that a claim of an erroneous jury charge must be evaluated by reading the alleged offending portion in the context of the trial court’s whole charge.” State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324 (1997) (quotations omitted).
  • State v. Hall 808 A.2d 55 N.H. 2002
    Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985); see State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324 (1997).
  • State v. White 765 A.2d 156 N.H. 2000
    The State had no duty to present these witnesses; it was simply required to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • State v. Marti 732 A.2d 414 N.H. 1999
    “We have long recognized the rule that a claim of an erroneous jury charge must be evaluated by reading the alleged offending portion in the context of the trial court’s whole charge.” State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324, 702 A.2d 306, 309 (1997) (quotation omitted).