Cited by
Opinions in New Hampshire that cite State v. Parker, 702 A.2d 306.
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State of New Hampshire v. Philip Brown
N.H. 2019
RSA 265-A:10 (2014); State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322-24 (1997) (upholding State’s closing argument and trial court’s jury instruction stating that jury could consider refusal to take alcohol concentration test as evidence of intoxication).
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State of New Hampshire v. Michael Flynn
N.H. 2017
a couple of times” after restarting; (6) the officer smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle and on the defendant’s breath; and (7) the defendant refused to take an alcohol concentration test, see State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322-23 (1997) (stating that a fact finder may infer from the defendant’s refusal to take an alcohol concentration test that “the defendant 6 did not take the test.
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State v. Addison
165 N.H. 381
N.H. 2013
tors: “(1) whether the prosecutor’s misconduct was *548 isolated and/or deliberate; (2) whether the trial court gave a strong and explicit cautionary instruction; and (3) whether any prejudice surviving the court’s instruction likely could have affected the outcome of the case.” Ellsworth, 151 N.H. at 155 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 122 (1st Cir. 2000)); cf. State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322 (1997) (citing federal standard for reviewing a defendant’s due process challenge
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State v. Saunders
55 A.3d 1014
N.H. 2012
“Due process requires that the State prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322 (1997); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
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State v. Stowe
34 A.3d 678
N.H. 2011
State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 322 (1997); cf. State v. Watkins, 148 N.H. 760, 769 (2002) (curative instruction appropriate where prosecutor “blatantly misstated the law”).
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State v. Leveille
7 A.3d 1175
N.H. 2010
State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 321 (1997); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-02 (1975).
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State v. Johnson
951 A.2d 146
N.H. 2008
The defendant does not challenge this portion of the trial court’s instruction, and we have previously upheld similar instructions.
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State v. Littlefield
876 A.2d 712
N.H. 2005
See, e.g., State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324-25 (1997); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-76 (1975); United States v. Smith, 145 F.3d 458, 460 (1st Cir.), cert.
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State v. Evans
839 A.2d 8
N.H. 2003
State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324 (1997) (jury instructions are *422 appropriate when they accurately state law and allow jury to exercise its own judgment in evaluating conflicting evidence).
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State v. Patten
813 A.2d 497
N.H. 2002
“We have long recognized the rule that a claim of an erroneous jury charge must be evaluated by reading the alleged offending portion in the context of the trial court’s whole charge.” State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324 (1997) (quotations omitted).
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State v. Hall
808 A.2d 55
N.H. 2002
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985); see State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324 (1997).
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State v. White
765 A.2d 156
N.H. 2000
The State had no duty to present these witnesses; it was simply required to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
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State v. Marti
732 A.2d 414
N.H. 1999
“We have long recognized the rule that a claim of an erroneous jury charge must be evaluated by reading the alleged offending portion in the context of the trial court’s whole charge.” State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324, 702 A.2d 306, 309 (1997) (quotation omitted).