Cited by

We review the trial court’s order for errors of law only, see Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 397 (1997), and find none.

Absent a transcript, we assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings, see Bean, 151 N.H. at 250, and review the trial court’s order for errors of law only, Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 397 (1997).

Absent a transcript, we must assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the decision reached.

Therefore, we assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination, id., and review its order for errors of law only, see Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 397 (1997).

Absent a transcript, we must assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the decision reached.

Accordingly, we conclude, as a matter of law, that RSA 105:2-a does not apply to the Town’s nonrenewal of the petitioner’s employment contract.

In making this argument, the respondent relies upon our decision in Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396 (1997), which is distinguishable from this case.

As the CAB explained, “[T]he failure of the claimant’s business caused the stress that resulted in his severe and disabling depression.” Without a transcript of the CAB hearing, we assume the evidence was sufficient to support this finding.

Accordingly, we must assume that the record supports the trial court’s ruling regarding the litigation strategy the petitioners pursued below.

Accordingly, we will review the district court’s decision for errors of law only.

Accordingly, we review the trial court’s order for legal errors only.

We considered an analogous argument in Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396 (1997).

We review the trial court’s ruling on the statute of frauds issue for legal errors only.

Accordingly, we assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings, and we review the trial court’s decision for errors of law only.

Furthermore, absent a transcript of the hearing, we must assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the result reached by the trial court.

Nevertheless, we do not assume that the legislature would enact statutory language that would lead to an absurd result.

Accordingly, we review the court’s order for errors of law only.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 396 (1997).

Moreover, the Court could not rule in Mr. Novak’s favor on this issue without violating its obligation to avoid construing statutory language in a manner that would lead to an absurd result, State v. Williams, 143 N.H. 559, 562 (1999) (quoting Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398 (1997)).

In construing a statute, we begin with an examination of the statutory language.

“This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole, and when the issue raised presents a new question of statutory construction, we begin our analysis with an examination of the statutory language.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997) (quotation omitted).

Because we presume that the legislature would not “enact statutory language that would lead to an absurd result,” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997), we now reject the reasoning articulated in Gilmore, see Gilmore, 135 N.H. at 239, 604 A.2d at 557.

“This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole, and when the issue raised presents a new question of statutory construction, we begin our analysis with an examination of the statutory language.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997) (quotation omitted).

Because'the statutes-do not on their face obligate towns to maintain bridges that are on private roads, and because such a construction would lead to the absurd result of obligating towns to maintain bridges to which the public has no right of access, see Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997) (statutes not interpreted to lead to absurd result), we conclude that a bridge is likewise private if the road it services is private.

board or *51 officer, to which prosecution or proceeding the person to whom such prescriptions, orders or records relate is a party.” This court is the final arbiter of legislative intent as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.

“[W]e do not assume that the legislature would enact statutory language that would lead to an absurd result.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997).

“This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole, and when the issue raised presents a new question of statutory construction, we begin our analysis with an examination of the statutory language.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997) (quotation omitted).

Because application of the plain meaning of the statute does not lead to an absurd result, see Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997), we construe it according to the common and approved usage of its language, see RSA 21:2 (1988).

[and] look to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute when possible.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997) (citation omitted).

Petition of Correia, 128 N.H. 717, 721, 519 A.2d 263, 266 (1986); cf. Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997) (refusing to interpret a statute in such a way as to lead to absurd results).

“Nevertheless, we do not assume that the legislature would enact statutory language that would lead to an absurd result.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997).

“[W]hen the issue raised presents a new question of statutory construction, we begin our analysis with an examination of the statutory language.” Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 398, 702 A.2d 333, 335 (1997) (quotation omitted).