Cited by

(stating that the interpretation of a deed is a question of law); Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 756 (1998) (stating that whether a contract term is ambiguous “is a question of law for this court to decide”).

Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 759 (1998) (explaining that “when the court has found a wage claim meritorious, it should exercise its statutory discretion by awarding reasonable counsel fees” in order to “effectuate the broad purpose [of the legislation] of protecting employees” (quotation omitted)).

Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 759, 713 A.2d 982 (1998) (we construe RSA chapter 275 in general to effectuate the broad purpose of protecting employees).

In Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 759-60 (1998), we expressly rejected identical arguments.

Ives v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 800 (1985) (holding that agreed-upon profit sharing “fall[s] within [RSA 275:42, Ill’s] reference to compensation calculated on some ‘other basis’” notwithstanding that the profit-sharing agreement “did not provide a stated date or certain time for payment of the share”); Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 756-57 (1998) (holding, in case involving contract interpretation, that a former employee was entitled to commissions on sales closed before

However, notwithstanding the participation of other Syncom employees in sales, the record demonstrates that the parties in this case, unlike those in Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 755 (1998), reached no agreement concerning the manner in which credit for sales was to be given to the various Syncom employees involved in making a particular sale.

Where, however, the terms of a contract are indeed ambiguous, and the fact finder has properly looked to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties, our standard of review is.more deferential.

Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 757 (1998) (emphasis added).

In addition, when contract terms are ambiguous, and the trial court has properly looked to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties, determining the ambiguous terms’ meaning should be left to the jury unless the meaning of the extrinsic evidence is so clear that reasonable people could only reach one conclusion.

“As a general rule, the proper interpretation of a contract is ultimately a question of law for this court, and we will determine the meaning of the contract based on the meaning that would be attached to it by reasonable persons.” Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 756 (1998) (quotation omitted).

ICS then moved for reconsideration based on language in Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, Ltd., 142 N.H. 752, 713 A.2d 982 (1998), which we decided after the superior court’s decision.

“As a general rule, the proper interpretation of a contract is ultimately a question of law for this court, and we will determine the meaning of the contract based on the meaning that would be attached to it by reasonable persons.” Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 756, 713 A.2d 982, 984 (1998) (quotation omitted).

Under New Hampshire law, “[a]s a general rule, the proper interpretation of a contract is ultimately a question of law for this court, and we will determine the meaning of the contract based on the meaning that would be attached to it by reasonable persons.” Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, 142 N.H. 752, 756, 713 A.2d 982, 984 (1998) (quotation omitted).

Because we have determined that it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment in the plaintiff’s assumpsit claim and are remanding for a determination of whether the second sales agreement was in fact a reaffirmation of the debt, it would be imprudent and speculative to address a quantum meruit claim at this time.

We conclude that the remedial purpose of the workers’ compensation law is best served by a rule that encourages claimants with meritorious appeals to seek compensation through the appeals process, cf. Galloway v. Chicago-Soft, Ltd., 142 N.H. 752, 759-60, 713 A.2d 982, 986 (1998) (awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to wage claim statute), while discouraging unnecessary litigation, see Bothwick v. State, 119 N.H. 583, 589, 406 A.2d 462, 466 (1979).